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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON TAX COMPLIANCE IN INDONESIA 
 
This dissertation studies the impacts of major tax reforms designed to improve tax 
compliance, particularly in the context of developing countries with limited enforcement 
capacity due to informality and lack of third-party data using the Indonesian tax 
administrative data as well as relevant empirical research methods. In order to describe this 
dissertation, I discuss each essay as the following. 
The first essay is titled "How Do Small Taxpayers Respond to Tax Simplification? 
Evidence from the Indonesian Turnover Tax Reform." This essay studies the firms' 
behavioral responses to tax simplification in Indonesia by exploiting the implementation 
of turnover tax in 2013 and the expansion of value added tax (VAT) registration threshold 
in 2014 as well as the fact that both turnover tax eligibility and VAT registration thresholds 
are at the same value. I find that firms intentionally bunch just above the threshold in order 
to avoid turnover tax regime. I also document that some firms started to bunch just below 
the threshold in order to avoid VAT registration when the threshold expanded. The results 
suggest that rms can face different types of notch at the same threshold and thus respond 
differently conditional on tax and non-tax incentives. 
The second essay is titled "Tax Evasion and Forgiveness: Evidence from the 
Indonesian Tax Amnesty Program." This essay examines the determinants of tax evasion 
and the compliance impacts of forgiving tax evaders using the 2016 Indonesian tax amnesty 
program where the government offers a set of discounted tax rates and penalties exemption 
on declaration of unreported net assets as an equivalent of unreported income. I document 
that the intensity in withholding tax, tax rates, level of income, as well as types of 
employment influence the decision to evade taxes. I further compare reported income 
between wage earners and self-employed individuals in each income percentile before and 
after the amnesty and find that the program provides no meaningful effect except limitedly 
for those in the very top of income distribution, e.g., around 6.1 percent increase in reported 
net income. The results are consistent with the argument that external factors motivate tax 
compliance. 
The third essay is titled "Compliance Effect of Tax Administration Reform on 
Wealthiest Individuals: Evidence from the Indonesian High-Wealth Individuals (HWI) 
Office." This essay investigates the effect of intensification of tax administration on HWIs 
     
 
compliance using the establishment of an HWI office in 2009 which administer individuals 
with gross assets of more than 100 billion IDR (around 10 million USD in 2009) and who 
reside in Indonesian capital city Jakarta. The policy creates quasi-experimental variation 
in the intensity of tax administration depending on the date of HWI office implementation 
(before and after the policy) and the types of tax office (HWI office and ordinary tax 
offices). I document that the HWIs reported income and income taxes at the HWI office 
decreased by about 40 percent over six years relative to those of HWIs administered by 
ordinary tax offices. The results support the literature that predicts that in the face of a 
certain examination the optimal strategy for high-income earners might involve some 
underreporting of income. The results also imply that the improvement of third-party data 
availability that can affect the likelihood of detection is a crucial factor in tax administration 
reform. 
 
KEYWORDS: Tax Simplification, Tax Compliance, Tax Notch, Tax Amnesty, Tax 
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Chapter 1
How Do Small Taxpayers Respond to Tax Simplification? Evidence from
the Indonesian Turnover Tax Reform
1.1 Introduction
A large share of small firms in the developing economies with lack of administrative
capacity to maintain proper recordkeeping and estimate accurate tax bases, hampers
governments in observing true tax bases and levying taxes on them (Gordon and
Li, 2009; Besley and Persson, 2014). The literature on compliance costs estimation
suggests that small firms regressively spend more costs to comply with tax law relative
to large firms (Tran-Nam et al., 2000). Presumed tax bases such as turnover, value
of assets, and deemed profit are reasonable alternatives when the preferred tax bases
such as income and value added are difficult for governments to measure, verify,
and monitor (Tanzi and de Jantscher, 1986; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1994). This
efficacy of presumed tax bases to simplify tax collection and reduce compliance costs
has attracted governments to adopt various types of presumptive taxes (Bird et al.,
2003). Moreover, governments exclude small firms from VAT system by imposing
registration threshold (Keen and Mintz, 2004; Kanbur and Keen, 2014). Previous
empirical works document firms responses to the implementation of presumptive taxes
(Fajnzylber et al., 2011; Bruhn and Loeprick, 2016) as well as to the VAT registration
threshold (Onji, 2009; Liu and Lockwood, 2016; Harju et al., 2019). However, few
studies examine firms concurrent responses to both turnover tax and VAT registration
threshold, specifically when they are at the same level.
This paper exploits the implementation of the 2013 Indonesian turnover tax regime
and the 2014 VAT registration threshold expansion where the turnover tax eligibility
threshold and the expanded VAT threshold are placed at the same value as well as use
the population of Indonesian corporate tax returns from 2012 to 2017 to study the
impact of tax simplification (e.g., turnover tax reform and VAT registration threshold
expansion) on the behavior of firms around the threshold. The turnover tax allows
taxpayers with previous year turnover of up to 4.8 billion IDR to be taxed at a
final rate of 1 percent on the turnover instead of taxed at 25 percent on profit.1
The turnover tax was designed to simplify tax system and reduce compliance costs
for small firms as well as minimizing governments monitoring costs. Theoretically,
the scheme would dismiss small firms from the complexity of profit calculation in
order to pay taxes. Despite the implementation of turnover tax, the Indonesian tax
laws that mandate all firms to maintain a proper book keeping and report financial
information such as balance sheet and profit and loss statements in tax return have
1In 2013, the exchange rate for 1 USD is around 10,000 IDR. Thus, 4.8 billion IDR is around
480,000 USD.
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not been repealed. These requirements imply that small firms eligible for turnover tax
regime potentially still bear similar compliance costs. Moreover, the average income
effective tax rates around the threshold is around 0.85 percent of turnover or slightly
below the turnover tax rate of 1 percent. In 2014, the government further simplify
taxation of small firms by increasing the VAT registration threshold from 600 million
to 4.8 billion IDR in annual turnover. This expansion reduces small firms’ compliance
costs yet removes firms’ rights to claim VAT on inputs. The impact of these policies
on small firms’ behavior would be determined by the change in tax and non-tax (e.g.
compliance costs and benefits) incentives.
I use a bunching approach developed by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) which
further extended by Kleven and Waseem (2013) to investigate the firms responses to
the turnover tax and VAT registration thresholds. The approach uses excess mass
near the threshold that represents discontinuity in incentives to obtain behavioral
responses and estimate structural parameters. The turnover tax implementation in
2013 and VAT threshold expansion in 2014 produce several incentive discontinuities at
the 4.8 billion IDR threshold, namely income tax rates, VAT rates, and compliance
costs and benefits which determine whether small firms obtain benefits from the
tax simplification or not. I use a framework discussed in Calonico et al. (2014) to
estimate discountinuities at the threshold that study whether the mechanism behind
the bunching responses is real responses, e.g., change in economic output, or evasion
responses, e.g., misreporting output.
I find that the implementation of turnover tax in 2013 induces observable bunching
responses just above the threshold due to a discrete fall in tax to turnover ratio
from around 1 percent to 0.85 percent. Moreover, firms just below the threshold
proportionally increase their turnover as well as direct input to locate just above the
threshold and avoid the turnover tax regime, keeping the continuity of tax to turnover
ratio around the threshold. This response can be considered as a real economic
response because the increase in turnover is accompanied with increase in productivity
as well as tax liabilities. The results translate into tax elasticity of around 0.726.
Moreover, I find that the expansion of VAT registration threshold in 2014 drives
some firms to bunch just below the threshold due to discrete jumps in tax and non-
tax (e.g., VAT compliance costs) incentives. These firms move from just above the
threshold to just below the threshold by decreasing their turnover to escape from the
VAT registration threshold. Moreover, the decrease in turnover is bundled with a
disproportionately larger decrease in direct input, suggesting that evasion mechanism
may occur behind the bunching responses. Moreover, I find that the bunchers’ direct
input reduction creates a discontinuity in direct input to turnover ratio of about 7.3
percentage points at the threshold which suggests that firms with larger value added
would stay away from the VAT system. The results translate into tax elasticity of
approximately 1.02.
Interestingly, after the VAT threshold expansion, some firms remain just above
the threshold and stay eligible to both VAT and income tax regime although facing
larger VAT burden and compliance costs. This response may be driven by a positive
significant non-tax benefits that firms receive from adopting and complying the in-
come tax regime of around 11.6 percent of the value added. This compliance benefits
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is greater than the sum of increases in VAT burden and compliance costs and thus
encourage firms to stay in the income tax regime. Moreover, I find that the exclusion
of the non-tax incentive leads to an overestimation of tax elasticity of around 14.12
percent.
This paper contributes to the literature on bunching responses (Kleven, 2016)
by providing evidence on firms responses to multiple tax notches at a single thresh-
old. Specifically, firms can face different tax notches (e.g., downward vs upward
tax notches) at a single threshold conditional on both tax and non-tax incentives.
Moreover, this paper reinforces an argument that non-tax incentive (VAT compliance
costs) has a key role in firms behavioral responses to size-based tax policy (Harju
et al., 2019). In addition to VAT compliance costs, this paper finds that the compli-
ance benefits from income tax regime may influence taxpayers’ movement around the
tax notches.
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the policy debate on the impacts on pre-
sumptive taxes on taxpayers behavior, e.g., Bruhn and Loeprick (2016) and Fajnzyl-
ber et al. (2011). Many governments often simplify taxation for small firms and
reduce compliance costs to encourage small firms’ compliance and participation in
tax system by enacting a presumptive tax regime. This paper provides evidence that
the size of effective presumptive tax burden is also a vital consideration in designing a
presumptive tax system. Particularly, without a considerable reduction in compliance
costs, firms would prefer a more complex income tax system with lower effective tax
burden relative to a simpler turnover tax with higher effective tax burden.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on compliance costs measure-
ments that argue that compliance costs have been overestimated due to the absence
of compliance benefits estimates (Johnston, 1963; Tran-Nam et al., 2000). This paper
particularly find that compliance benefits from income taxes can exceed VAT com-
pliance costs and influence taxpayers’ decision making with respect to size-based tax
policies (e.g., VAT registration and turnover tax eligibility thresholds).
1.2 Setting and Data
1.2.1 Taxation of Small Firms in Indonesia
In general, the Indonesian firms are taxed at around 25 percent on profit. More-
over, the tax schedule for firms with turnover of up to 50 billion IDR is a flat rate
of 25 percent with a 50 percent reduction of the tax rate to taxable income corre-
sponding to turnover of up to 4.8 billion IDR. On the other hand, small firms in
Indonesia has been subject to a couple alternatives of presumptive tax regimes. The
first regime is a deemed profit tax implemented in 1986 and the second regime is the
turnover tax regime enacted in 2013. Under the deemed profit tax regime, small firms
calculate their income tax liabilities using a range of profit ratios determined by the
government which often are more than 20 percent.2 The second regime is a turnover
2There are around 1,435 industry categories that their profit ratios are determined by the gov-
ernment. For example, the profit ratio for wholesaler, retailer, and event organizer are around 20
percent, 25 percent, and 50 percent. These ratios are then multiplied by the turnover in order to
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tax regime which imposes a final tax rate of 1 percent on gross income to small firms
instead of 25 percent on profit. Prior to the implementation of turnover tax regime,
firms below the threshold can elect their preferred tax regime, i.e. deemed profit tax
or corporate income tax regime. However, since 2013, most firms below the threshold
must elect the turnover tax regime.
The government sets an eligibility threshold for presumptive tax regimes in terms
of annual turnover. The presumptive tax threshold is typically similar to the VAT
registration threshold. For example, the annual turnover threshold for the deemed
profit tax and VAT registration is 600 million for the year 2010 to 2013. In 2014,
annual turnover threshold for turnover tax and VAT registration is exapanded to
4.8 billion IDR . In other words, the government has been removing small firms
from the VAT system as well as offering them with less complicated presumptive
tax regime. Despite this tax simplification, the laws that requires firms to maintain
book keeping, estimate profit, and report financial information to tax authority have
not been repealed. This book keeping provision allows me to observe firms financial
reporting near the threshold and study how they respond to tax simplification.
The general provision and procedures of taxation law mandates all Indonesian
firms to maintain a book keeping practice.3 The book keeping practice includes
consistent recording financial information such as gross income, cost of good sold,
profit, expenses, assets, liabilities, and capitals as well as compiling income statement
and balance sheet at the end of fiscal year. The financial information is then reported
in the corporate tax return as starting point of the estimation of taxable income and
income tax liability. The comercial net income will be adjusted to obtain taxable
income by accounting for differences in treatment and timing of accruing income
and expenses between firms’ accounting practices and the income tax law (book-tax
adjustments).
1.2.2 The 2013 Turnover Tax Reform
In 2013, Indonesian government enacted a turnover tax scheme for taxpayers with
previous year turnover of up to 4.8 billion IDR.4 Under this scheme, eligible taxpayers
are taxed at a final rate of 1 percent on the turnover in lieu of 25 percent on firms’
profit. The level of previous annual turnover would dictate the type of regime that
firms should follow for the current year. If a firm earned more than 4.8 billion in
the current year, it is required to pay monthly income tax installments tax starting
January next year. And vice versa, if a firm earned less than the threshold, it is
required to pay monthly turnover taxes starting January next year. Moreover, some
firms in certain industries, such as construction and real estate, specifically regulated
by other special tax regimes are not eligible for the turnover tax scheme. Thus, I
exclude construction and real estate firms in the estimation of behavioral responses
get the taxable income and eventually the income tax liability.
3Article 28 of Law number 6 year 1983 as already amended several times and the latest by Law
number 28 year 2007 regarding General Provision and Procedures of Taxation.
4Government Regulation Number 46 year 2013 regarding taxation on business income of certain
individual and corporate taxpayer.
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because they may not affected by the turnover tax reform.
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Notes: The figure shows the scatter plot of average corporate income tax to turnover ratio in 100
equally sized bins before (2007-2012) the turnover tax reform. The left vertical line represents the
old (2003) VAT registration and small firms threshold at 0.6 billion IDR and the right vertical line
represents the new (2013) small firms threshold and the new (2014) VAT registration threshold.
The horizontal-dashed line denotes the turnover tax rate of 1 percent applicable for taxpayer with
turnover of up to 4.8 billion IDR.
Figure 1.1 shows that the average corporate income tax to turnover ratio prior
(2007-2017) to the reform is less than the mandated turnover tax rate of around 1
percent. The average tax ratio between the old and new small firms thresholds is
around 0.85 percent to 0.9 percent. In other words, the reform raises the average
effective tax burden for small firms. Thus, all else equal, small firms might prefer
income tax regime relative to turnover tax regime.
The reform simplifies tax regime for small firms yet does not remove the main costs
of complying with income tax laws, e.g., book keeping practice and financial informa-
tion reporting. The income tax compliance costs in Indonesia is substantial. Susila
and Pope (2012) find that the cost of complying to income tax regime for Indonesian
firms, on average, is around 28 percent of total compliance costs or approximately
3.14 percent of turnover. Thus, I expect that change in tax incentive would solely
drive the firms’ behavioral responses to the turnover tax eligibility threshold.
1.2.3 The 2014 Value Added Tax Reform
Following the turnover tax reform, in 2014, the government further simplifies
taxation for small firms by increasing the VAT registration threshold from 0.6 billion
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IDR to 4.8 billion IDR, corresponding to the turnover tax eligibility threshold. Firms
with turnover below the VAT threshold are freed from VAT compliance costs of
about 3 percent of turnover for firms with turnover above 3 billion IDR and around
11.2 percent of turnover for firms with turnover of up to 3 billion IDR (Susila and
Pope, 2012). However, firms with turnover under the threshold are not allowed to
claim input VAT. Thus, I expect that changes in both tax as well as non-tax (e.g.,
compliance costs and benefits) incentives would stimulate the firms’ responses to the
expanded VAT registration threshold.
Figure 1.2: Excess Mass: Single vs Multiple Thresholds
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Notes: The figure shows the observed annual turnover distribution before (2012) and after (2013) the
turnover tax reform as well as after (2014) the VAT reform. Panel A compares the 2012 turnover
distribution (solid-triangle line) and the 2013 turnover distribution (solid-dotted line). Panel B
compares the 2012 turnover distribution (solid-triangle line) with the 2014 turnover distribution
(solid-dotted line).
Firms responses to the two reforms are well captured by Figure 1.2. Panel A
shows that the turnover tax reform induces taxpayers to bunch just above the thresh-
old. The 2012 distribution of turnover is a counterfactual for such responses. This
type of bunching is known as bunching at a tax notch where the incentives change
discontinuously. Surprisingly, Panel B shows that, after the 2014 VAT registration
threshold increase, the shape of bunching changes into kink type of bunching as if
the incentives change marginally. 5This paper examine the mechanisms behind tax-
payers responses to both turnover tax and VAT reforms. Specifically, the study looks
at various incentives discontinuities at the threshold including tax rates as well as
compliance costs and benefits.
5Appendix Figure A.1 shows decomposition of firms by tax regime before (2012-2013) and after
(2014-2017) the expansion VAT registration threshold, indicating that firms bunch at different side
of the threshold conditional on tax regime (turnover vs income taxes).
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1.2.4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the Indonesian tax administrative data set that
contains population of corporate tax returns from 2007 to 2017. The data includes
detailed information on revenue and expenses, fiscal adjustments, tax payments, tax
credits, and, industry classification. The data contains composition of expenses which
can be used to study the mechanism behind small firms responses to the tax scheme.
The information on industry classification can be exploited to estimate heterogeneity
of responses among the sectors. I restrict the data to cover only firms and not individ-
uals because the number of individual taxpayers around the turnover tax threshold is
smaller than that of firms and thus the distribution of the former is relatively noisier
than the latter.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Turnover Tax Reform
Before reforms (2012) After reforms (2014)
Below Above Below Above
Variables threshold threshold threshold threshold
Turnover (billion IDR) 0.485 106.08 0.426 95.591
(0.864) (947.919) (0.786) (948.196)
Direct inputs (billion IDR) 0.319 78.679 0.276 70.65
(0.745) (722.932) (0.848) (696.442)
Net income (billion IDR) 0.098 10.457 0.091 9.062
(10.927) (249.355) (11.123) (250.406)
Net fiscal adjustments (billion IDR) 0.025 3.181 0.104 3.774
(7.028) (70.078) (5.403) (91.926)
Income tax liabilities (million IDR) 6.297 1,879.215 2.865 1,607.941
(256.032) (38,344.33) (193.892) (53,560.04)
Turnover tax liabilities (million IDR) n/a n/a 1.926 3.237
(n/a) (n/a) (5.879) (16.814)
Number of firms
Turnover > 0 242,279 66,278 268,829 84,571
Turnover = 0 148,846 - 193,225 -
Direct input to turnover ratio
All firms 0.363 0.739 0.334 0.729
(4.181) (0.334) (7.216) (0.35)
Firms with non-zero turnover 0.587 0.739 0.575 0.729
(5.301) (0.334) (9.453) (0.35)
Fiscal adjustments to turnover ratio
All firms 0.0566 0.0544 0.188 0.087
(3.325) (1.356) (5.177) (0.773)
Firms with non-zero turnover 0.0913 0.0544 0.324 0.087
(4.226) (1.356) (6.78) (0.773)
Notes: Statistics reported are means with standard deviations in parentheses in the year before
(2012) and after (2014) the turnover tax and VAT reforms. All monetary variables are measured in
constant 2010 IDR.
Table 1.1 displays the summary statistics of the variables before (2012) and af-
ter (2014) the turnover tax and VAT reforms. It can be seen that firms below the
threshold have considerably smaller average annual turnover, input, profit, fiscal ad-
justments and income tax liabilities relative to those above the threshold both before
and after the reforms. Moreover, except fiscal adjustments, all monetary variables
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are lower in 2014 than in 2012. Firms below threshold have considerably larger in-
crease in average fiscal adjustments (319 percent) relative to that of firm above the
threshold (19 percent). This meaningful change might be caused by misreporting of
income subject to final tax as well as fiscal adjustments by firms eligible for turnover
tax. The discussion of this misreporting is discussed in Appendix C. The appendix
indicates that different misinterpretation of the definition in income subject to final
tax can be the driver of the misreporting. The discusion indicates that around 50
percent of firms report gross income as income subject to final tax and the rest of
firms reports net income as income subject to final tax. The appendix concludes that
the misreporting is not performed strategically and thus excluding it from the dataset
would not much effect the analysis.
The table also shows that firms with no turnover account more than one third of
firms below the threshold in 2012 and 2014. This makes the averages for firms below
threshold look much smaller relative to those of firms above the threshold where
they all have non-zero turnover. The financial ratios, namely direct input and fiscal
adjustments to turnover tax ratios are presented into two categories, such as all firms
and firms with non-zero turnover. The results demonstrate that the size of firms with
zero turnover affects the averages of financial ratios.6
1.3 Theoretical Framework
1.3.1 Framework Set Up
I set up the framework based off the model developed by Kleven and Waseem
(2013). I also consider VAT compliance costs as one of the drivers of bunching re-
sponses as in Harju et al. (2019). However, my framework handles multiple notches
(downward and upward) that occur at the same threshold. This feature is absent
from the contexts and models developed in the previous bunching studies.
The turnover tax and VAT thresholds cause several discontinuous increases in
average costs of taxation such as tax rates (income tax and VAT) and compliance
costs (income tax and VAT reporting requirements). Thus, the thresholds produce a
notch in firms’ budget set. Previous studies suggest that this notch can affect behavior
which can be observed as an excess mass of firms located in the tax preferred side
near the threshold in the turnover distribution.
Assume that a group of many firms producing a homogeneous good and selling
their products to consumers. Consider perfectly elastic demand and the good’s price
is normalized to one. A firm is type a, capturing its productivity. Production of value
added, v = (1 − α)y, 0 ≤ α < 1, needs intermediate goods as inputs. Let α be the
amount of inputs to produce one unit of revenue y. Consider firm’s disutility from
6The tax payments as well as financial ratio for firms inside the window of bunching analysis
which is -2,000 milion IDR to the left and 2,000 million IDR to the right of the threshold are provided
by Appendix Table A.1 and A.2. These tables provide yearly summary of firms’ characteristics











where e is the elasticity of tax base with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
The firm maximizes quasi-linear utility u(y) = c − φ(y), where c = (1 − α)y −
τ(y, α) − t(y, α) − θ(y, α), τ(y, α) represents accrued VAT payment, t(y, α) denotes
accrued income tax payments, and θ(y, α) denotes VAT net compliance costs. The

















(1− α)y − φ(y) (1.2)
The framework is designed to analyze tax and non-tax incentives produced by
a turnover tax and VAT registration thresholds commonly imposed to small firms.
The expansion of VAT threshold from 600 million IDR to 4.8 billion IDR is relatively
large and thus firms near the new threshold may have different characteristics and
respond differently to the policy.7 However, the dataset indicates that firms around
the old VAT threshold are similar to those near the new VAT. For example, both of
them have inputs to turnover ratio and wages to turnover ratio of around 0.65 and
0.16 respectively. In addition, the Indonesian government defines large firms as those
with annual turnover of above 50 billion IDR. Therefore, the utility maximization
framework is practical in this analysis. Moreover, Liu and Lockwood (2016) suggest
that the utility maximization framework is equivalent to the profit maximization
framework under the assumption that production function is fixed-coefficients. 8
I further assume that the firm is unable to pass VAT burden to consumers by
increasing the price. This assumption is build on both theoratical literature (Keen
and Mintz, 2004; Kanbur and Keen, 2014) and empirical evidence (Carbonnier, 2007;
Benedek et al., 2015; Kosonen, 2015; Benzarti et al., 2017; Harju et al., 2018) studying
the incidence of VAT. Likewise, I assume that the firm cannot pass the compliance
costs and benefits to consumers through price increase. However, I implement various
degree of tax incidence in the estimation of elasticity of taxable base to check for
consistency.
1.3.2 Single Threshold
I start with the model coresponds to the 2013 turnover tax notch and extend it
to include VAT notch starting in 2014. In 2013, a firm pays turnover tax instead of
7Appendix D shows that behavioral responses to the previous VAT threshold are relatively
similar to those of the new threshold discussed in Section 1.5.
8Appendix Table A.1 shows that frms in the window of bunching analysis have relatively similar
direct inputs to turnover ratio before (2012-2013) the VAT registration threshold expansion, sug-
gesting a fixed-coefficient production function. Moreover, Appendix E provides a brief discussion on
the comparability between utility and profit maximization frameworks in bunching analysis.
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income tax when its annual turnover less than the threshold. In 2014, a firm eligible
for turnover tax regime is exempted from the VAT system. Thus, I will abstract the
VAT system from the analysis for 2013 (single threshold case) and incorporate it to
the analysis for 2014-2017 (multiple threshold case).
I also exclude income tax compliance costs θ from the first part of the study
because the costs do not change at the turnover tax threshold in 2013. The firm
below the turnover tax threshold is still required to report turnover, expenses, profit,
fiscal adjustments, and submit the corporate tax return as well as remitting VAT and
reporting VAT monthly tax returns. I assume the disutility from producing output






, instead of expression in Equation (1.1) because the tax base
is turnover y and not value added (1 − α)y. The utility of a firm under and above
the turnover tax threshold in 2013 is
u(y) =
{
(1− T )y − φ(y) if y ≤ y∗
(1− t)y − φ(y) if y > y∗
(1.3)
where T is the turnover tax rate when T > t (based on the statutory value of T
and the observed value of t).
Solving maximization problem in Equation (1.3) for firms below y∗ yields y = a(1−
T )e. Consider a smooth cumulative distribution of firms with productivity levels F (a)













. Therefore, absent any discontinuity at y∗ a smooth
turnover distribution exists.
Using the first-order condition y = (a∗ − ∆a∗)(1 − T )e, the utility for lowest-
productivity firm (type L) as the marginal buncher at y∗ −∆y∗ is 9





The utility for the highest-productivity firm (type H) at the notch point y∗ is







Given uL = uH and a∗ −∆a∗ = y∗−∆y∗
(1−t)e , the following expression can be derived






























9Under a downward notch, the best interior location yI corresponds to y∗ − ∆y∗ because the
marginal buncher’s budget set does not change (Kleven, 2016).
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This formula provides a relationship between tax elasticity, the behavioral re-
sponse of the marginal buncher relative to the threshold ∆y
∗
y∗
, and the effective tax
rates below (T ) and above (t) the threshold. The above expression is the formula for
bunching at a downward notch where average tax rate discretely falls at the threshold.
1.3.3 Multiple Thresholds
In 2014, Indonesian government increased the VAT registration threshold from 600
million to 4.8 billion IDR, equalizing the turnover tax threshold. Therefore, there are
three notches at the same level of turnover, namely VAT rate, turnover tax rate, and













(1− α)y − φ(y) if y > y∗
(1.6)
Rearranging the previous equation, I get the following expression
u(y) =
{
(1− γB)(1− α)y − φ(y) if y ≤ y∗
















denote the effective tax
rates below and above the threshold, γB < γA when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The selection criteria for tax regime is the following
y =
{
y ≤ y∗ if γB < γA − θ
y > y∗ if γB > γA − θ
(1.8)
The above selection equation describes the relationship between tax regimes, tax
rates above and below the threshold, and compliance costs (benefits).
Budget sets in Figure 1.3 illustrate bunching at multiple (turnover tax and VAT)
thresholds. ∆γ represents the discontinuous change in average effective total tax
burden when the turnover tax and VAT thresholds are surpassed. Panel A displays
a condition when average costs of taxation falls at the threshold or known as an
downward notch. In this panel, Firm L represents the marginal buncher with turnover
y∗−∆y in the absence of the threshold with ability a∗−∆a∗. This firm is indifferent
between locating at y∗ or y∗ −∆y. Thus, there will be bunching at the threshold for
firms with abilities within the range [a∗ −∆a∗]. Panel B illustrates a situation when
average costs of taxation jumps at the threshold or known as a upward notch. In this
panel, Firm H represents the marginal buncher with turnover y∗+ ∆y in the absence
of the thresholds with ability a∗ + ∆a∗. This firm is indifferent between locating at
y∗ or yI . Thus, there will be bunching at the threshold for firms with abilities within
the range [a∗ + ∆a∗].
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Figure 1.3: Behavioral Responses to Tax Notches
Panel A: Budget Set Diagram: Downward Notch Panel B: Budget Set Diagram: Upward Notch
Notes: The figure shows behavioral responses to an average tax costs fall (downward notch) and to
an average tax costs jump (upward notch) in two budget set diagrams. Panel A illustrates behavioral
responses to falls in total average costs of taxation such as tax rates, and compliance costs (benefits).
Panel B illustrates behavioral responses to jumps in total average costs of taxation. In Panel A,
firms in the intervals [yI , yA] and [yA, y∗] will bunch at as well as move strictly above the threshold,
respectively. In Panel B, firms in the interval [y∗, yI ] will bunch at the threshold.
1.3.3.1 Downward tax notch: taxpayers in the income tax regime
Similar to the downward notch in turnover tax regime, I can state uLD = u
H
D
where D refers to the downward tax notch analysis. Using the first-order condition
y(1 − α) = (a∗ −∆a∗)(1 − γB − θB)e , the utility for lowest-productivity firm (type







The utility for the highest-productivity firm (type H) at the notch point y∗ is







From the condition uLD = u
H
D and the relationship a
∗−∆a∗ = y∗−∆y∗
(1−γB)e , the following
































This expression explains the relationship between tax elasticity, the response of the
marginal buncher, the tax rates above and below the threshold, and VAT compliance
costs (benefits) in the context of downward tax notch analysis.
1.3.3.2 Upward tax notch: taxpayers in the turnover tax regime
The utilities of marginal buncher H and the firms with lowest-productivity L
locating at y∗ are indifference, suggesting that uLU = u
H
U where U denotes the upward
tax notch analysis. For a type-L firm, the utility is the following
uLU = y








For a type-H firm, based on the maximization of utility above y∗ in Equation
(1.3), i.e. y∗(1− α) = (a∗ + ∆a∗)(1− γA − θ)e, the utility is the following
uHU = (a






From the condition uLU = u
H
U and using the relationship (y
∗ + ∆y∗)(1 − α) =
(a∗ + ∆a∗)(1− γB)e, the following expression can be derived

































This expression explains the relationship between tax elasticity, the response of the
marginal buncher, the tax rates above and below the threshold, and VAT compliance
costs in the context of upward tax notch analysis.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Bunching Estimation
In general, bunching estimator can be defined as an estimation of the excess mass
of taxpayers at the threshold by comparing the density of taxpayers bunching at the
threshold with the density of taxpayers at the same turnover level in the absence of
the threshold. The key procedure is to remove the influence of the threshold from
the observed turnover distribution to obtain a counterfactual distribution. Thus, the
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identifying assumption of the causal interpretation is that the distribution of turnover
would have been smooth if there were no discontinuity in average costs of taxation,
in this case tax burden and net compliance costs.
The eligibility turnover and VAT registration threshold set by the reforms at the
turnover value y∗ persuade excess mass at the threshold for firms that fail to optimize
the turnover tax or VAT registration. The bunching is motivated by the productivity
parameter a. It will create an excess mass by firms that would have reported a





g(y)d(y) ' g(y)4 y∗ (1.15)
where B(y∗) is the excess mass and g(y) is the counterfactual density of the turnover
distribution absent the threshold.
I estimate the bunching responses caused by the turnover tax and VAT thresholds
by comparing the observed excess mass in the turnover distribution above (below)
the threshold to the counterfactual density that would occur in the absence of the
discontinuity at the thresholds. This bunching estimate consists of average tax rate
and net compliance costs. Following Chetty et al. (2011), Kleven and Waseem (2013),
to estimate the counterfactual density, I fit a flexible polynomial function to the
observed turnover distribution, excluding a range around the threshold.
I group firms into turnover bins of 100 million IDR and estimate a counterfactual
density by regressing the following equation and excluding the region around the








θi1(yj = i) + εj (1.16)
where cj is the count of firms in turnover bin j, yj is the level of turnover in bin j, q
is the order of the polynomial, and θi is dummy for the excluded region. The range
(yB, yA) specifies turnover bins near the threshold where bunching exists and thus
excluded from the regression. The excess bunching mass start from lower bound of
the excluded turnover region, yB, to the upper bound of the excluded region yA. εj
is the error term of the turnover density equation.
The counterfactual distribution estimate is the predicted bin counts ĉj from Equa-
tion (1.16) excluding the dummies in the omitted region [yB, yA]. The excess bunching
is defined as the difference between the observed and the predicted bin counts over
the region near the turnover and VAT thresholds. I estimate yA iteratively so that
the region below counterfactual density (B) is equal to the region above the observed




(ĉj − cj) and Â =
yA∑
i=y∗
(cj − ĉj) (1.17)
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I raise repeatedly the value of yA until the excess mass (A) equals the missing
mass (B). I then estimate the relative excess bunching b̂ by dividing the excess mass















where Nk is the number of bins within [yB, y




To estimate discontinuities in tax outcomes, e.g., turnover, direct input, and in-
come tax liabilities at the threshold, I use a regression discontinuity estimator dis-
cussed in Calonico et al. (2014). The key identifying assumption of the estimator is
that the assignment variable, i.e. turnover can not be manipulated and thus observed
bunching at the threshold would be undesirable. Under no manipulation of the run-
ning variable, the discontinuity can be interpreted as the causal effect of the policy.
However, this paper do not attempt to estimate the causal effect of the turnover
tax on firms’ outcomes but study the nature of manipulation around the threshold
(e.g., turnover scalling down vs turnover misreporting). Therefore, the key identifying
assumption of the estimator will be relaxed in this analysis.
This paper uses estimates in discontinuity around the threshold from the years
prior to the reforms as counterfactuals, assuming that but for the reform, the running
variable just above and below the threshold would be similar and not manipulated
by firms. The manipulation of running variable would be suggested by the presence
of bunching at the threshold. Figure 1.2 shows that there is no observable bunching
at the threshold before (2012) the implementation of turnover tax. Therefore, firms’
manipulation on turnover as well as other outcomes (e.g., direct inputs, income tax
payments) near the threshold after 2012 can be solely attributed to the reform.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Bunching at Single Threshold
Figure 1.4 displays the turnover distributions for all firms around the turnover
tax threshold before (2012) and after (2013) the implementation of turnover tax
scheme. Panel A shows that there is no observable bunching at the threshold in 2012,
suggesting that any behavioral response to the threshold after the implementation of
the turnover tax can be solely attributed to the reform. Moreover, Panel B shows
that excess bunching at the threshold emerges and is statistically significant (1.173
10In initial bunching papers, e.g., Chetty et al. (2011), the b̂ estimator is defined as the ratio of
excess mass over the height of the counterfactual density at the threshold.
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(0.359)). This excess bunching indicates a type of bunching at downward notch where
average tax rate discretely falls at the threshold.11
Figure 1.4: Behavioral Responses to Single Threshold
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Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual
Excess bunching (b) = 1.173 (0.359)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counterfac-
tual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million
IDR and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual
is a fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in
the upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region
near the threshold relative to the average counterfactual count in this region.
This bunching responses are driven by the jump in tax incentives where the 1
percent turnover tax rate imposed by the government is relatively higher than the av-
erage income tax to turnover ratio around the threshold which is around 0.85 percent
(See Figure 1.1). Panel A and B of Figure 1.5 shows that the conditional expectation
function estimates at the threshold is around 0.85 percent. Panel C further shows
that firms around the notch with previous year turnover of above the threshold and
thus ineligible to the turnover tax regime also have tax liability to turnover tax ratio
of around 0.85 percent. On the other hand, the conditional expectation of average
tax liability to turnover tax ratio for firms eligible to the turnover tax threshold are
around 0.95 percent to 1 percent.
11Appendix Table B.1 shows that the excess bunching estimates are relatively similar under
seveth-order polynomial counterfactual but overestimated when third-order polynomial is used to
construct counterfactual distribution.
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Figure 1.5: Tax Liability to Turnover Ratio (2011-2013)
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Number of observations: left = 7,230 / right = 2,208
Difference at the threshold d = −0.0018 (0.0006)
Notes: The figure plots the average tax liability to turnover ratio near the threshold before (2011-
2012) and after (2013) the turnover tax reform. Panel A and B depicts the ratio for all firms. Panel
C and D depicts the ratio for firms with previous year turnover above (ineligible) and below (eligible)
the turnover tax eligibility threshold respectively. The tax liability in panel A, B, and C includes
only income tax liability. The tax liability in panel D includes both income tax and turnover tax
liabilities because the turnover tax ragime was implemented in July 2013. The vertical solid line
is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold is 50 and to the
right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the threshold represent
the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold. Difference at the
threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized threshold.
1.5.2 Bunching at Multiple Thresholds
Figure 1.6 presents bunching around the threshold after (2014-2017) the expansion
of VAT registration threshold. Despite the discontinuity in tax rates and compliance
costs at the threshold, panel A shows that the threshold induces a kink pattern instead
of a notch pattern. However, the turnover tax and VAT threshold expansion introduce
no marginal change in both tax incentives or compliance costs around the threshold.
In fact, when taxpayers are grouped by tax regimes (e.g., income tax and turnover
tax), the kink regime would disappear and two notches appear as demonstrated in
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panel B and C.12
Figure 1.6: Behavioral Reponses to Multiple Thresholds (2014-2017)
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Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform and VAT threshold
expansion in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR. The
threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a fifth-order polynomial esti-
mated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the upper part of the excluded
region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near the threshold relative to
the average counterfactual count in this region.
Panel B shows the distribution of turnover for firms with previous year turnover
more than the threshold and thus subject to income tax regime. It presents a clear
evidence of a downward tax notch for firms subject to income tax regime. This notch
occurred in 2013 and was induced by the turnover tax reform (see Figure 1.2 and
1.4) and continue to exist even after the VAT registration threshold was increased to
12Appendix Figure B.2, B.3, B.4, B.6, and B.7 present observed bunching by year, tax regime,
industry, and type of firm. The figures suggest that bunching responses to both turnover as well
as VAT registration thresholds are relatively observable in all major industries, particularly trade
and manufacturing. The figures also shows that responses from partneships are slightly larger than
corporations.
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the same level of turnover tax threshold. The number of firms bunching near the tax
notch is around 1,787 and the excess mass is meaningful and statistically significant
(0.818 (0.246)).13
Panel C present the distribution of turnover for firms with previous turnover of
up to 4.8 billion IDR and thus are required to be in the turnover tax regime. It shows
an evidence of an upward tax notch for firms subject to turnover tax regime. The
notch occurred after the government increase the VAT registration threshold in 2014.
The firms in the bunching area are those with last year turnover less than or equal
to the threshold. The number of buncher near the tax notch is around 1,824 and the
excess bunching is around 0.864.
1.5.3 Mechanism: Real vs Evasion Responses
This section discusses whether the mechanism of bunching responses to the thresh-
old is real economic responses (e.g., change in real output) or evasion responses (e.g.,
manipulation of turnover). Studying the mechanism of responses sheds light on
whether the estimated elasticities of taxable base represents long-run or short-run
effects of tax reforms. Real responses produce lasting impacts relative to behavioral
responses and thus the differentiation is essential for welfare analysis (Seim, 2017).
Slemrod (1995) indicates that evasion and avoidance responses, as opposed to real
responses, to tax reforms would emerge when circumstances (e.g., enforcement, tax
loopholes) are favorable.
Liu and Lockwood (2016) find evidence on evasion responses in the form of mis-
reporting turnover to avoid VAT threshold. The study detects the misreporting by
observing that firms just below the threshold have higher direct input to cost ratio
relative to those just above the threshold. On the other hand, Harju et al. (2019) find
real responses to the threshold indicated by a jump in direct input at the threshold.
The jump implies that firms just below the threshold have higher value added and
thus profit margin relative to those just above the threshold.
Before discussing the responses to the VAT threshold, I provide suggestive evi-
dence on the mechanism behind the bunching responses to the turnover tax regime
in 2013. Panel A of Figure 1.7 demonstrates that no discontinuity in direct input
to turnover ratio after the implementation of turnover tax in 2013. Panel C further
shows that there is no statistically significant discontinuity in commercial net income
in 2013. The results suggest that firms that bunch just above the threshold increase
proportionally their turnover and direct input to avoid falling into the turnover tax
regime. In other words, the results provide evidence on real economic responses to
the turnover tax regime.
13Appendix Figure B.1 plots estimates for excess bunching after the reforms for each tax regime.
The figures demonstrates that excess bunching estimates in the income tax regime has been slightly
decreasing while those of the turnover tax regime has been consistently increasing.
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Figure 1.7: Direct Input and Commercial Net Income
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Notes: The figure plots the average direct input to turnover ratio (panel A and B) and the average
commercial net income to turnover ratio (panel C and D) around the threshold. The vertical solid
line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold is 50 and
to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the threshold
represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold. Difference
at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized threshold.
Moreover, panel B of Figure 1.7 demonstrates that direct input to turnover ratio
jumps around 7.3 percentage point at the notch after the expansion of VAT regris-
tration threshold in 2014, leading to a fall in the commercial net income to turnover
tax ratio of about 3.1 percentage point as shown in panel D. The results suggest that
firms disproportionately reduce direct input as they reduce output in order to avoid
the registration threshold. Thus, the discontinuity in direct input to turnover ratio
can be thought as a suggestive evidence for evasion responses to the VAT threshold.
1.5.4 Estimates for Compliance Costs and Tax Elasticity
I estimate the VAT compliance costs and tax elasticity using models outlined in
Section 1.3 and behavioral responses estimated in Section 1.5. I independently solve
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Equation (1.5) in the case of single threshold and simultaneously solve Equations
(1.10) and (1.14) in the case of multiple thresholds to recover the estimates using




I also consider the VAT compliance costs estimate from Susila and Pope (2012) as
part of the total compliance costs estimated in the multiple notch setting.
Table 1.2 presents the estimates for compliance costs and tax elasticity with re-
spect to reported value added. The table shows that the tax elasticity in the single
notch in 2013 is around 0.727. I assume no discontinuity in compliance costs since the
bookkeeping regulations have not been repealed. The results suggest that tax incen-
tive was the single motivation for firms around the notch under the single threshold
condition to bunch above the notch and avoid the turnover tax regime in 2013.
Table 1.2: Elasticity of Tax Base and Compliance Costs
Compliance Tax elasticity (e)
costs (θ) θ > 0 θ = 0
Single tax notch (2013) - - 0.727
(0.000)
Multiple tax notches (2014-2017) -0.157 1.020 1.290
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: the table presents the estimates for elasticity of tax base and compliance costs. To obtain




I also find that the compliance costs are about -15.7 percent of the value added,
suggesting that moving from income tax and VAT to turnover tax forgoes non-tax
incentives around 4.7 percent of the turnover. Given that the average VAT compliance
costs for firms with turnover from 3 billion to 10 billion IDR are about 3 percent of
turnover Susila and Pope (2012), the results suggest that the compliance benefits of
being in the income tax regime for firms above the threshold are around 1.7 percent
of the turnover.14
Moreover, I find the tax elasticity under multiple thresholds is about 1.020 and is
larger than that of the single threshold. It may suggest that firms are more responsive
to the VAT system relative to the income tax. Finally, the tax elasticity increases
to 1.290 if the non-tax incentives are absent in the estimation. The results suggest
that firms respond not only to change in tax incentives but also to change in non-tax
incentives.
14The compliance benefits estimate is likely to be an upper bound because VAT compliance costs
for firms with turnover of 4.8 billion is potentially larger than the average VAT compliance costs
of around 3 percent. The regressiveness of VAT compliance costs suggests that firms with turnover
of 3 billion IDR would pay compliance costs of more than 3 percent while those with turnover of
10 billion IDR would pay compliance costs of less than 3 percent. Thus, this regressivity indicates
that the VAT compliance costs estimate for firms at the threshold is larger than the average VAT
compliance costs of 3 percent.
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1.6 Conclusion
Governments often impose a presumptive tax regime to and exclude small firms
from VAT system in order to reduce compliance costs that are regressive as well as cut
monitoring costs. These policies require a certain eligibility threshold to keep firms
with sufficient administrative capacity stay in the preferable yet more complex tax
systems (e.g., income tax and value added tax). Previous studies show that threshold
creates discontinuity in tax incentives as well as compliance costs and drives firms to
bunch just below or above it. However, few works have been conducted on multiple
thresholds where turnover tax elibility and VAT registration threshold are the same.
This paper studies the behavioral responses to the implementation of turnover tax
system in 2013 as well as the expansion of VAT registration threshold in 2014. I find
that firms bunch just above the threshold in 2013 to avoid the turnover tax regime
which imposes relatively higher tax burden relative to income tax regime. In 2014,
firms in the turnover tax regime bunch just below the threshold to avoid the VAT
registration threshold. Despite the emergence of the upward notch for firms in the
turnover tax regime in 2014, the upward notch for firms in the income tax regime
persist but slightly moderated through 2017 due to net compliance benefits.
I also document some suggestive evidence on mechanism of bunching responses
to the turnover tax eligibility and VAT registration threshold. In 2013, firms pro-
portionately increase direct input as they increase output to avoid falling into the
turnover tax regime, suggesting that the bunching responses can be considered as
real economic responses. However, in 2014, firms in the turnover tax regime dispro-
portionately decrease direct input and thus get higher profit margin as they reduce
output to avoid the VAT system, implying that the bunching responses can be seen
as tax evasion responses.
The findings suggest that firms can respond differently to a tax notch particularly
when it involves multiple tax regimes and heterogeneity in profit margin. Moreover,
the findings consistent with the previous works studying a single tax threshold (e.g.,
VAT, turnover tax, profit tax) which document that tax incentives as well as non-tax
incentives such as compliance costs and benefits are the main drivers to bunching
responses to a tax notch. Finally, the findings imply that governments should decom-
pose the behavioral responses to a threshold if it involves multiple tax regimes.
Copyright c© Himawan Saputro 2021
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Chapter 2
Tax Evasion and Forgiveness: Evidence from the Indonesian Tax Amnesty
Program
2.1 Introduction
One of the key factors in tax revenue collection is governments capacity to verify
the accuracy of self-reported tax base and enforce compliance (Slemrod and Gillitzer,
2013). A growing literature suggests that third-party reporting, paper trails, and
whistle-blowers provide information on tax base such as income and value added
that can be used by governments to improve the reporting accuracy and bolster the
enforcement capacity.1 In other words, the enforcement capacity would be seriously
compromised when governments have limited accesible information on tax base. The
variation in availability of information on tax base can explain the stark differences
in tax revenue to GDP ratio between developed and developing countries (Gordon
and Li, 2009; Besley and Persson, 2014; Kleven et al., 2016).
The vital role of information in taxation can also explain the fact that govern-
ments in developing countries often rely on the value added tax (VAT) as well as
the presumptive taxes instead of the income taxes. The VAT is generally known
for its self-enforcing mechanism due to invoice trail on transactions between parties
(Bird et al., 2007; Keen and Lockwood, 2010). Empirical evidence shows that the
self-enforcing property of VAT invoice plays important role in increasing governments
enforcement capacity (Pomeranz, 2015; Naritomi, 2019). Moreover, developing coun-
tries often implement presumptive taxes instead of income taxes presumed tax bases
such as turnover and assets are easier to observe and verify relative to income (Tanzi
and De Jantscher, 1987). Empirical evidence indicates that presumptive taxes such
as turnover tax reduce tax evasion (Best et al., 2015). Despite the empirical works
on tax evasion in the context of VAT and presumptive taxes, few works have been
conducted to study tax evasion in the context of income tax system, particularly in
developing countries.
This paper uses quasi-experimental variation from the Indonesian tax amnesty
that provides incentive for tax evaders to confess their evasion and the population
of tax administrative data to study the determinants of income tax evasion and the
1An expanding literature on tax compliance highlights that third-party information on tax base
can be used by governments to verify the accuracy of self-reported tax base. Kleven et al. (2011) finds
a significant evasion in a group of taxpayers with less third-party data while almost no evasion in a
control group subject to withholding tax. Pomeranz (2015) and Naritomi (2019) find that taxpayers
with more transactions backed by VAT invoices have less evasion than those with less transactions
involving VAT invoices. Slemrod (2019) provides a nice survey on tax compliance, emphasizing that
external factors such as third-party data, audit rate, and penalty motivate compliance rather than
internal factors such as tax morale, etc.
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compliance effects of forgiving tax evaders. The program offers an opportunity for tax
evaders to declare their unreported net assets, as equivalent of unreported income,
be taxed a set of lower tax rates ranging from 2 to 10 percent conditional on location
of assets and timing of declaration instead of regular income tax rates which has top
marginal tax rates of 30 to 35 percent and freed from all penalties.
The program was designed to collect additional tax revenue from past unreported
income to finance a major fiscal deficit in 2016 as well as to improve future compliance.
Many governments in both developed and developing countries have implemented tax
amnesties to generate short-term revenue (Le Borgne and Baer, 2008; Mikesell et al.,
2012). A laboratory experiment shows that tax amnesty can also increase long-term
revenue stream when accompanied by stricter enforcement (Alm et al., 1990). The
Indonesian tax amnesty was introduced shortly after the massive leak from offshore
financial institutions known as the ”Panama Paper” published by the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) on April 2016 containing the names
and adresses of the owner of shell companies. (Alstadsæter et al., 2018) indicate that
Indonesian wealthy individuals have the highest propensity to own offshore wealth
relative to wealthy individuals in other countries. Recent studies reveal that provid-
ing amnesty to offshore tax evaders increases long-term revenue when bundled with
higher probability of detection due to novel third-party information such as infor-
mation exchange with tax haven countries and whistle-blowers (Johannesen et al.,
2018; Alstadsæter et al., 2019). Moreover, tax amnesty can be a reasonable policy
to recover some of the evaded taxes when administrative costs to enforce tax evaders
are significant (Langenmayr, 2017).
I divide my analysis into two parts. First, I study the determinants of tax evasion
by exploiting variation in the participation of taxpayers in the Indonesian amnesty
program. I use logit specification to assess various factors such as withholding tax,
level of income, and types of employment, that may affect the probability of partic-
ipation which highly correlates with past tax evasion. I estimate that self-employed
individuals in the top income distribution (i.e. decile 10) with no withholding tax have
and with fully tax-withheld income have the probability of conducting tax evasion
and participating in the amnesty of around 80 percent and 55 percent respectively.
On the other hand, the probability of participation of wage earners in the top income
decile with no withholding tax as well as with fully tax-withheld income are about
45 percent and 20 percent respectively.
Second, I study the impacts of tax amnesty on taxpayer compliance. I exploit the
variation in the intensity to withholding tax mechanism as well as the level of income
to analyze the change in reported net income. Specifically, I use quantile generalized
difference-in-differences to compare reported net income changes in taxpayers that
face insignificant withholding tax mechanism (self-empoyed) versus taxpayers that
face intensive withholding mechanism (wage earner) by income percentile. I find that
reported net income do not change except in percentile 100 by about 6.1 percent on
average as a result of the amnesty program.
This paper contributes to the broad literature on tax compliance (Andreoni et al.,
1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Alm, 2019; Slemrod, 2019) by providing evidence
on various factors that motivate taxpayers’ decision to evade taxes. Specifically, this
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paper reinforces an argument that third-party information has a vital role in nurturing
compliance (Kleven et al., 2011; Pomeranz, 2015; Naritomi, 2019). This paper also
contributes to the literature which argues that the variation in the level of income
greatly influences how taxpayers respond to changes in tax administration (Slemrod
et al., 2001).
Furthermore, the this paper contributes to the literature on the impacts of tax
amnesty (Le Borgne and Baer, 2008; Mikesell et al., 2012). Many tax jurisdictions
implemented tax amnesty to generate short-term revenue as well as to revitilize
longer-term revenue collection. This paper provides new causal evidence on com-
pliance impacts of tax amnesty program using quasi-experimental variation strategy.
The results reinforce previous findings from laboratory experiment which suggests
that tax amnesty can improve longer-term compliance if post-amnesty enforcement
is strengthen (Alm et al., 1990).
2.2 Institutional Background and Data
This section presents institutional background on the Indonesian tax amnesty and
the details of the policy that are essential for the empirical analysis. First, I describe
the relevant features of the Indonesian tax system and the amnesty program. I then
describe the dataset used to estimate the parameter of interests.
2.2.1 Tax Regimes
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world with population of
270 million people in 2019 . The country’s GDP is around 1,119 billion US Dollars
in 2019 which placed it as the sixteenth biggest economy in the world. Its economic
growth for the past two decades is hovering at about 5 percent. Despite the robust
economic performance, Indonesia’s total tax to GDP ratio has not been gone up
from around 12 percent in the last decade. This ratio is below the OECD average
(34.2 percent), African countries (18.2 percent) and Latin American countries (22.8
percent). In addition, Indonesia’ tax ratio is relatively smaller relative to its neighbor
such as Thailand (17.6 percent), Philippines (17.5 percent), Singapore (14.1 percent)
and Malaysia (13.6 percent). Its poor tax revenue collection has been creating large
growing fiscal deficit in the state budget and expanding government debts.
The Indonesian tax system was first modernized in 1983 to mitigate a potential
shortfall from the oil and gas revenue by the introduction of the value added and
luxury tax and the progressive income tax, replacing the 1951 sales taxes and the
former Dutch colonial income tax. The reforms attempted to raise sufficient revenue,
promote economic efficiency, and improve income distribution by implementation
of broad based and simple tax system with tax rates lower than other developing
or developed countries (Gillis, 1985). Over the period of 2011 to 2015, Indonesia
relies heavily on the VAT and corporate income taxes which account for around 40
percent and 20 percent of total tax revenue respectively. Moreover, the contribution
of personal income tax to total tax revenue is around 10 percent where the majority
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(more than 95 percent) of it is raised through a withholding tax mechanism (DJP,
2016).
Indonesia implements three regimes for taxing individuals income, namely the
personal income tax, deemed-profit method, and turnover tax. The personal income
tax was introduced in 1983 and has several tax brackets with marginal tax rates of
5 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent, and 30 percent. In addition, the income tax also
provides a special treatment for self-employed workers and individuals performing
independent services such as medical doctors, lawyers, and accountants with annual
turnover of up to the VAT registration threshold (600 million IDR) to maintain record
keeping and estimate their net income using deemed-profit method estimated by the
government instead of maintain book keeping and calculate their net income using
accounting rules. This special scheme is designed to simplify taxation for small tax-
payers and reduce costs of compying with tax laws. In 2013, the government enacted
a new presumptive tax (e.g. turnover tax regime) that stipulates self-employed indi-
viduals, except those performing independent services, with previous year turnover
of up to 4.8 billion IDR to be taxed with a 1 percent final tax on the turnover in lieu
of progressive tax rates on net income/profit.2
The income tax system is equiped with a set of withholding tax provisions with
respect to various types of income such as wage income, self-employed income, and
capital gain. The majority of withholding tax revenue are collected through article
21, 23 and 4 paragraph 2 of the income tax law. The article 21 mandates employers to
withhold income tax from employees monthly wage income. The article 23 prescribes
withholding mechanims for income from tachnical, management, construction, and
consulting services as well as rent from non-property assets. The article 4 paragraph
2 covers withholding rules for dividend, property and land rent, interest, capital gain
from selling assets such as property and securities. Unlike the article 21 and 23, the
article 4 paragraph 2 is a final withholding tax mechanism where the income and
taxes withheld are excluded from the estimation of taxable income and income tax
liabilities in the end of fiscal year. These withholding taxes must be remitted and
reported to the tax authority on monthly basis.
Both wage earners and self-employed are required to file income tax return by the
end of the third months of the next fiscal year. Wage earners typically receive their
net-of-taxes income from their employers. Whereas self-employed individuals have to
maintain book keeping to record their income and expenses as well as estimate their
income tax liabilities. Individual taxpayers have to report not only income and tax
payments but also wealth and liabilities in the tax return including their types, date
of acquisitons and acquisition values. However, wage earners with annual income of
up to 60 million IDR are allowed to report only the total wealth and liabilities. This
feature allows the tax authority to match retained income and additional net wealth
each year in order to check for a potential evasion. Individuals with a gap between
retained income and additional net wealth are required to amend their tax returns.




Indonesian taxation is administered by the Directorate General of Taxes (DGT)
of the Ministry of Finance. In 2001, the government of Indonesia initiated tax ad-
ministration reform stipulating that taxpayers are administered based on the size of
their businesses and tax payments to reinforce fiscal capacity after the Asian financial
crisis hit the country’s economy in 1998. The 2001 reform includes the creation of two
Large Taxpayers Offices (LTOs) which administer several hundreds largest taxpaying
firms. The LTOs have more strictier monitoring due to higher staff-to-taxpayer ratio,
better employee remuneration than ordinary tax offices. The administration in ordi-
nary tax offices are structured with respect to types of taxes such as personal income
tax, corporate income tax, value added tax, and withholding taxes. The LTOs admin-
istration departs from tax-types to all-taxes approach where all taxpayers’ obligations
are integratedly monitored.
In 2007, the government gradually expanded the tax administration reform by
creating Medium Taxpayers Offices (MTOs) and Small Taxpayers Offices (STO),
replacing all ordinary tax offices in the country. MTOs administer largest taxpayers,
particularly corporations, in regional level. Several MTOs also administer foreign
firms, publicly traded firms, oil and gas firms, as well as expatriates. The ratio of
tax official and taxpayer is smaller in LTOs and MTOs relative to that of STOs.
A group of high wealth individuals are selected to be administered and monitored
within an LTO unit called High Wealth Individuals (HWI) Office and the rest of
individual taxpayers are administered within STOs. In STOs, a size-based taxpayer
administration is also implemented. A group of 100 or 200 largest taxpayers in each
STO are selected and scrutinized more thoroughly relative to the rest of taxpayers.
The size-based administration reflected in the new organizational structure as well
as the taxpayers monitoring activities increases the probability of detection of larger
taxpayers to relative to smaller taxpayers.
2.2.3 Tax Amnesty
The Indonesian tax amnesty program was implemented by the Indonesian govern-
ment in 2016 in response to a large potential fiscal deficit in the state budget. Under
this program, taxpayers are given an opportunity to declare unreported net assets
(i.e., unreported asset minus liabilities), as an equivalent of unreported income, and
provided with a set of lower tax rates ranging from 2 percent to 10 percent as well as
freed from penalty. The unreported assets and liabilities eligible for the program are
those that should have been reported for the fiscal years of up to 2015. Therefore,
the 2016 tax returns would theoretically reflect the true assets and liabilities.
The program consists of three periods where each period offers different tax rates
conditioned on the types of asset declared, i.e. foreign assets or domestic assets. For-
eign assets declaration is taxed higher than domestic assets declaration, except when
the foreign assets are repatriated to Indonesia. In the first period (July-September
2016), the tax rates are 2 percent for domestic assets declaration and foreign assets
declaration and repatriation as well as 4 percent for foreign assets declaration. In
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the second period (October-December 2016), the tax rates are 3 percent for domestic
assets declaration and foreign assets declaration and repatriation as well as 6 percent
for foreign assets declaration. And, in the third period (January-March 2017), the
tax rates are 5 percent for domestic assets declaration and foreign assets declaration
and repatriation as well as 10 percent for foreign assets declaration. The potential
impact of amnesty is expected to occur in 2016 because the 2016 tax return must be
filled by the end of March 2017 after the first and the second periods of the program
have ended as well as parallel with the third period of amnesty which also ended in
March 2017.3
From the program, the Indonesian tax authority collected significant amount of
tax revenues, i.e., 0.92 percent of GDP. To date, this yield has been the highest
amnesty yield in the world, exceeding those of 2015 Chilean amnesty (0.62 percent
of GDP), 1997 Indian amnesty (0.58 percent of GDP) and 2009 Italian amnesty (0.2
percent of GDP). Moreover, the assets declared in the program is around 39.3 percent
of GDP, while those of Chilean, Indian, and Italian are 8.3 percent, 2.1 percent, and
5.2 percent respectively (DJP, 2017).
2.2.4 Post-Amnesty Compliance Monitoring
In 2017, the Indonesian tax authority issued a circular letter regarding post-
amnesty compliance monitoring. 4 The letter mandates tax offices and officials to
examine the accuracy of assets and liabilities reported during the amnesty program.
The letter also orders examination of the reporting accuracy of taxpayers that do not
participate in the program. In conducting the examination, the tax authority utilizes
third-party data on assets as well as liabilities supplied by government and private
institutions.5 Taxpayers will be notified by the tax authority if any discrepancies in
assets, liabilities, and income were found during the examination.
Moreover, in 2017, the government of Indonesia requires financial service insti-
tutions (i.e., institutions that operate in the area of banking, capital market, and
insurance) to supply financial information to the tax authority for taxation purpose.6
This policy relaxes bank secrecy in Indonesia and strengthen the capacity of the tax
authority to enforce tax compliance during post-amnesty period.
3Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 11 Year 2016 Regarding Tax Amnesty enacted on
July 1, 2016.
4Circular Letter of Director General of Taxes Number SE–20/PJ/2017 as last amnended by
Circular Letter of Director General of Taxes Number SE–14/PJ/2018 Regarding Post-Amnesty
Taxpayers Monitoring
5In 2012, the government of Indonesia enacted Government Regulation Number 31 Year 2012
Regarding Provision and Collection of Data and Information Related to Taxation. This regulation
allows the tax authority to receive various third-party data on assets, liabilities, income, etc. from
local and central government institutions as well as private associations.
6Government Regulation in lieu of Law Number 1 Year 2017 Regarding Access to Financial
Information for Taxation Purpose
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2.2.5 Data
To estimate the compliance effect of the amnesty, I use Indonesian tax administra-
tive data at individual level. I study the population of individual income tax returns
from year 2010 to year 2017 containing around 30 million individual taxpayers. I
focus on Individual taxpayers because they account for 70 percent of the tax amnesty
participants and 95 percent of the amnesty yield whereas corporate taxpayers’ share
of participants is around 30 percent which account only 5 percent of the amnesty
yield.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Tax Amnesty
Wage Earner Self-employed
10th Decile 1st − 9th Decile 10th Decile 1st − 9th Decile
Variables TA Non TA TA Non TA TA Non TA TA Non TA
Net income 500.53 395.2 32.7 26.25 724.25 438.76 77.95 63.73
in million IDR (1,005.99) (440.84) (28.92) (22.21) (2,698.73) (11.956.59) (37.51) (27.68)
Taxable income 690.61 404.08 45.45 31.55 471.11 363.18 7.1 3.14
in million IDR (2,703.55) (11,920.58) (36.62) (27.58) (1,081.24) (445.59) (85.45) (14.75)
Income taxes 167.14 76.22 6.91 2.46 106.79 72.01 0.73 0.29
in million IDR (562.32) (571.84) (169.33) (18.49) (408.47) (127.44) (5.52) (2.88)
Withholding taxes 152.65 72.94 5.88 2.48 71.18 61.86 0.29 0.19
in million IDR (497.81) (558.81) (114.57) (33.33) (263.03) (114.99) (2.85) (2.21)
N in thousand 66.74 390.29 106.75 3,375.84 25.22 8.59 418.75 516.32
of observations
Notes: Statistics reported are means with standard deviations in parentheses in the year before
(2015) the amnesty program implementation. All monetary variables are measured in constant 2010
IDR.
Table 2.1 presents the means and the standard errors of the data for each par-
ticipation group in each subgroup. The table shows some differences among these
participation groups. First, in each subgroup, the means of reported net income,
taxable income, income taxes and withholding taxes of the amnesty participants are
higher than those of nonparticipants. These differences could be interpreted that
taxpayers facing higher marginal income tax rates are more likely to evade taxes
and later reveals some of the evaded taxes when governments offer forgiveness. This
is consistent with literature on tax evasion that finds marginal tax rates as one of
the factors that influence tax evasion decision (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Kleven
et al., 2011). Second, the share of withholding taxes for wage earner is higher than
self-employed within all income deciles. Consequently, the share of taxpayers in self-
employed group which participated in the program is larger than their counterparts in
the wage-earner group. This variation has been commonly observed in many tax sys-
tems and frequently exploited as identification strategy due its randomness. Third,
self-employed in the 1st − 9th deciles who participated in the program have lower
share of withholding taxes than nonparticipants in the self-employed group. These
variations further support the argument that withholding mechanism plays essential
role in deterring tax evasion. These figures reveals some characteristics that motivate
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decision to evade taxes and then later participate in the amnesty program.
2.3 Determinants of Tax Evasion
2.3.1 Descriptive Evidence
Figure 2.1 provides descriptive evidence to rationalize the comparison between
self-employed and wage earners in estimating the determinants of tax evasion as well
as the impacts of tax amnesty. Although the tax amnesty program is offered to all
taxpayers, those who have more tax evasion would get higher benefit from discounted
tax rates and waived penalty and thus are more likely to particate in the program.
Panel A and B of Figure 2.1 compare the percentage taxpayers who participated
and did not participate in the program between self-employed and wage earners as
well as between income groups. They clearly demonstrate a substantial difference in
the rate of participation in the program between the two types of employment and
between the ten income groups, particularly in the self-employed group. The figure
suggests that self-employed individuals have higher rate of participation and thus
more evasion than wage earners in all income groups. Moreover, the figure indicates
that high income groups are more likely to participate and potentially have more
hidden net assets than low income groups.
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Notes: The figure shows the program participation rates in percentage by decile of net income
distribution. Panel A and B show the participation rates of self-employed individuals and wage
earners respectively. The participation rates in each panel are further categorized into three program
periods. The dark blue bars represent the first amnesty period, the blue bars represent the second
amnesty period, and the light blue bars represent the third amnesty period.
Figure 2.2 displays average withholding tax to tax liability ratio by amnesty pe-
riods, types of employment, and income groups. Panel A of Figure 2.2 shows that
withholding tax ratios for self-employed participants are significantly lower than non-
participants in all income deciles. Panel B of Figure 2.2 shows that wage earn-
ers participants also have lower yet insignificant withholding tax ratio relative to
non-participants. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that self-employed have lower average
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withholding tax ratio relative to wage earners in almost all income groups. The de-
scriptive statistics displayed in Figure 2.1 and 2.2 are consistent with the argument
that third-party information provides deterence effect on taxpayer’s decision to evade
taxes (Saez, 2010; Kleven et al., 2011).
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Notes: The figure shows the average withholding tax to tax liability ratio by income decile and
amnesty period. Panel A and B show the average withholding tax ratio for self-employed and wage
earners respectively.
The descriptive evidence from the tax amnesty participation indicates that with-
holding tax to tax liability ratio, level of income, and types of employment could
be the main determinants of tax evasion. To validate this argument, I assume that
types of employment are exogenous and tax evasion is not factored in the taxpayer’s
decision to select types of employment. Therefore, the fact that self-employed group
has higher withholding tax ratio and thus more likely to evade may be uncorrelated
with the selection of types of employment.
2.3.2 Empirical Analysis
To formally test whether amnesty participation correlates with the withholding
tax ratio, types of employment, and level of income, I set up three regression spec-
ifications. The baseline specification is to linearly regress tax amnesty participation
on withholding tax ratio and tax amnesty rates. The second specification involves
logistic regression using the same dependent and independent variable. The argu-
ment for this specification is that the descrioptive evidence shows that the share of
participants increases non-linearly through income groups. The third specification
uses ordered-logit specification since the amnesty program is implemented in three
phases where each one offers a different tax rate. To implement those specifications,
I use the following equation
Aisd = βWi + ηs + δd + γXisd + εisd (2.1)
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where A is the tax amnesty participation dummy (1 if participate and 0 if not for the
first and second specifications and 1 if participate in period 1, 2 if participate in period
2, 3 if participate in period 3, and 0 if not for the third specification) for individual
i with type of employment s in decile d. W is withholding tax to tax liability ratio
for each individual, η denotes type of employment fixed effects, δ is income decile
or percentile dummy, and X is a vector of controls for regional tax office code and
industry classification. Since the second and the third specifications are logit and
ordered logit respectively, the regression outputs are transformed into probability
using margins to make the interpretation easier. Based on the previous descriptive
evidence, I expect strong correlations between the intensity of withholding tax and
the level of income as well as the probability of participating in the tax amnesty
program.
2.3.3 Results
Table 2.2 shows that, in all three specifications, withholding tax ratio is negatively
and significantly correlated with amnesty participation. In other words, the proba-
bility of participating in the program increases as the withholding tax ratio goes to
zero. This indicates that evaders are more likely to have lower withholding tax ratio.
On the other hand, the estimated coefficients of self-employed and income deciles are
positive and significant. The size of the coefficients of self-employed variables are sim-
ilar to those of the withholding tax ratio, implying that types of employment is also
a key determinant of tax evasion. The coefficients of income decile dummy variables
increase as the deciles climb up from the bottom to the top. The results suggest that
taxpayers in the higher income group that face higher marginal income tax rates are
more likely to evade taxes and then participate in the amnesty program.
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Table 2.2: Tax Amnesty Participation
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Logit Ordered Logit
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio -0.187∗∗∗ -1.591∗∗∗ -1.416∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.080) (0.061)
Self-employed 0.221∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.133) (0.122)
Income decile 2 0.052∗∗∗ 0.036 0.041
(0.009) (0.043) (0.044)
Income decile 3 0.204∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.046) (0.048)
Income decile 4 0.232∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.062) (0.058)
Income decile 5 0.245∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.060) (0.054)
Income decile 6 0.253∗∗∗ 1.635∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.076) (0.066)
Income decile 7 0.273∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 1.487∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.088) (0.072)
Income decile 8 0.283∗∗∗ 2.150∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.088) (0.071)
Income decile 9 0.301∗∗∗ 2.423∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.093) (0.075)
Income decile 10 0.375∗∗∗ 3.081∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.082) (0.071)
R2 0.275
N Obs. 13,370,910 13,370,910 13,370,910
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The reference group for self-employed is wage earners and for
income deciles is income decile 1. All specifications are controlling for industry classification and
regional tax office fixed effects.
Figure 2.3 shows the marginal effects of withholding tax to tax liability ratio on the
probability of participating in the amnesty program for both wage earners and self-
employed individuals. The figure demonstrates that the probability of participating in
the amnesty program is relatively low in Decile 1 and Decile 2 for both self-employed
and wage earners. However, self-employed have singificantly larger probability in
Decile 3 up to Decile 10 relative to wage earner. The probability gaps between those
groups are wider as the withholding tax to tax liability ratio goes to zero. The results
suggest that the marginal effects increase as income decile goes higher and withholding
tax to tax liability ratio decreases. Moreover, the figure shows that self-employed
individuals in the top income distribution (i.e. decile 10) with no withholding tax have
and with fully tax-withheld income have the probability of conducting tax evasion
and participating in the amnesty of around 80 percent and 55 percent respectively.
On the other hand, the probability of participation of wage earners in the top income
decile with no withholding tax as well as with fully tax-withheld income are about
45 percent and 20 percent respectively. The results indicate that marginal effects
for self-employed individuals are larger than those for wage earners. The results are
consistent with the arguments that withholding tax mechanism reduces tax evasion
(Kleven et al., 2011) and high-income earners have larger capacity to evade taxes
(Alstadsæter et al., 2018).
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Figure 2.3: Marginal Effects of Withholding Tax Ratio on the Probability of Partici-
pation (Logit Specification)
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Notes: The figure shows the marginal effects of withholding tax to tax liability ratio on the prob-
ability of participating in the amnesty program for both wager earners (solid-dotted line) and self-
employed individuals (solid-triangled line) by income decile obtained from logit specification with 95
percent confidence interval. The results from linear and ordered logit specifications are presented in
Appendix Figure G.1 and G.2, respectively. The latter shows that the probability of participating
in the first period of amnesty which offer the lowest tax rates is significantly higher than in other
periods, suggesting that tax rate also affects decision to evade taxes. The implications of variation in
the size of tax amnesty rates and timing of net assets declaration on the probability of participation
are discussed in Appendix G.
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2.4 The Effect of Tax Amnesty on Compliance
Previous literature finds that the magnitude of tax evasion grows with true income
and tops at the 99 to 99.5 percentile(Johns and Slemrod, 2010). The finding is similar
to the previous section results (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3) that show that level of
income determines the level of tax evasion indicated by the probability to participate
in the tax amnesty. These findings imply that the distribution of tax evasion can
be expected to be left-skewed, and thus mean estimator might not be well-suited
to estimate the impact of amnesty on tax compliance. Therefore, I employ quantile
estimation to better assess the effect of tax amnesty.7
Figure 2.4: Reported Net Income by Percentile: Self-Employed vs Wage Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. The vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the
amnesty program was implemented.
7Quantile estimation is often utilized in the literature on the impact of health policy where the
eligibility for Medicaid is determined by the left-skewed distribution of income (Maynard and Qiu,
2009; Engelhardt and Gruber, 2011).
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2.4.1 Descriptive Evidence
Figure 2.4 shows the reported net income of both self-employed individuals and
wage earners before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty program by in-
come percentile. The figure shows that there is no meaningful gaps in the percentage
change in average reported net income between self-employed and wage earners be-
fore and after the amnesty program except in percentile 100 (Panel A).8 The result
suggests that the program limitedly impacts a group of taxpayers that potentially
received more intensive monitoring due to the Indonesian size-based tax administra-
tion.
2.4.2 Empirical Analysis
To test whether the tax amnesty affects compliance or not, I compare changes
in reported net income between self-employed (treatment group) and wage earners
(control group) before and after the program implementation. I use the reported net
income as it is the variable directly impacted by the policy. The identification strat-
egy exploits the variation in the intensity of withholding tax mechanism. Taxpayers
that face trivial withholding tax mechanism (self-employed) are more likely to evade
and thus more affected by the amnesty program than taxpayers with significant with-
holding tax (wage earners). I use the following generalized difference-in-differences
framework to estimate the parameter of interest
Yst = α + γs + δt +
2014∑
t=2010




πt ×Ds × 1(y = t) + βXst + εst (2.2)
In this equation, Y is the log real reported net income in type of employment
s in year t = 2010, ..., 2017, γ denotes types of employment fixed effects, δ is a set
of year fixed effects that represent changes common to types of employment, Ds
equals 1 if type of employment is self-employed, and εst is clustered by regional tax
office. The year dummy prior the amnesty implementation, 1(y = 2015), is ommited,
normalizing the estimates for θ and π to 0 in 2015. The vector of covariates (X )
includes industry classification and regional tax office code. The coefficients π2016 to
π2017 capture the impact of the amnesty program on individuals’ reported net income.
The framework is applied independently to each of the income percentile to reflect
the shape of probability distribution of tax evasion and thus better assess the impacts
of tax amnesty.
The amnesty impact, averaged across all post-amnesty periods, can be estimated
using a standard difference-in-differences (DD) specification,
Yst = α + γs + δt + πTreats.Postt + βXst + εst (2.3)
8The comparisons of log average reported net income between self-employed and wage earners
for all percentiles are presented in Appendix H.
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where Treat equals 1 if type of employment is self-employed and equals 0 if wage
earner, Post equals 1 if y ≥ 2016 and 0 if y ≤ 2014, and εst is clustered at the regional
tax office level.
2.4.3 Results
I start the analysis by presenting the coefficients from the standard DD specifica-
tion in Equation (2.3). The results suggest that the tax amnesty program produces
limited effects on taxpayers’ reported net income except that of taxpayers in the very
top income distribution. Row 1 of Table 2.3 shows that the differences in the log
reported net income between wage earners and self-employed are near zero for all
representative income precentiles before the tax amnesty implementation. Row 2 of
the table further shows miniscule differences in reported net income after the pro-
gram except for percentile 100. In the very top percentile, the tax amnesty program
increases reported net income by 6.1 percent. Appendix J provides the estimates
for all percentiles and demonstrates a similar pattern on coefficients where almost
no meaningful effect was found except in the top 1 percent of income distribution.
This limited impact might be driven by the adoption of size-based tax administration
by the Indonesian government where tax authority focuses its limited resources to
taxpayers with the highest revenue risks.
Table 2.3: Tax Amnesty Impact on Reported Net Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
P-20 P-30 P-40 P-50 P-60 P-70 P-80 P-90 P-100
Before Amnesty
(2010 to 2014) x -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 -0.023
Self-employed (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017)
After Amnesty
(2016 to 2017) x 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 0.061∗∗
Self-employed (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018)
R2 0.998 0.998 0.993 0.990 0.994 0.994 0.990 0.955 0.079
N Obs. 9,394 7,780 10,201 11,699 20,402 28,837 46,666 67,268 84,450
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment, industry classification, and regional tax office fixed effects. The estimates are similar
to those of unbalanced panel regressions presented in Appendix Table I.1.
Figure 2.5 presents the event-study coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that
capture the impact of amnesty program on taxpayers’ reported net income relative to
the year before the program implementation. The figure shows that the coefficients to
the left of the normalized year (2015) are mostly indifferent from zero. The coefficients
to the right of the normalized year (2015) are also mostly indifferent from zero except
for percentile 100 presented in Panel A of Figure 2.5. The coefficients π are about
5 percent in 2016 and 7 percent in 2017. The event-study coefficients for all income
percentiles are presented in Appendix K. The appendix shows that coefficients θ and
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π are indifferent from zero in the majority of income percentiles except in the top 1
percent of income distribution. This evidence suggests that government monitoring
and enforcement activities are constrained with resources and thus largely channeled
to taxpayers with high revenue risks.
Figure 2.5: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income by Income Percentile
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Notes: The figure shows the effects of amnesty on reported real net income for 10 representative net
income percentiles. Panel A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I present the coefficients θ and π of percentile
100, 90, 80, 70, 60, 50, 40, 30, and 20 respectively.
The coefficients of interest presented in Table 2.3 and Appendix J are summarized
in Figure 2.6. The figure shows that the coefficients π are around zero in most of the
income percentile before (2010-2014) the amnety program. The figure also shows that
the coefficients π are also about zero in most of the income percentile after (2016-
2017) the amnesty program except for percentile 100. These coefficients suggest that
the amnesty program provides limited affect only to those with very high revenue
risks and that have been highly monitored by governments.
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Figure 2.6: Summary of the Tax Amnesty Effect on Reported Net Income
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Notes: The figure shows the effects of amnesty on reported real net income. Panel A and B display
the coefficient π of Equation (2.3). The solid line represents the coefficients of interest before (2010-
2014) and after (2016-2017) the program. The solid dotted-line represents the 95 percent confidence
interval.
2.5 Conclusion
I find that withholding tax, level of reported income, tax rates, and types of
employment determine the decision to evade taxes. The intensity of withholding
tax explains why self-employed individuals have higher amnesty participation rates
and thus higher tax evasion relative to wage earners. The amnesty participation
rates also vary with income groups where the highest participation rates occur in
the highest income percentile. Moreover, self-employed tends to have more evasion
than wage earners, all else equal. I further document that tax evaders prefers lower
tax amnesty rates offered in period 1 of the program. The findings are consistent
with the literature on tax compliance and enforcement (Slemrod, 2019) which shows
that external factors, e.g., third-party data, level of income, tax rates, and types of
employment, motivate taxpayers decision to evade taxes.
I document that the program did not improve the long-term compliance except of
taxpayers at the very top of the income distribution that face stricter post-amnesty
monitoring (e.g., intensification of post-amnesty compliance monitoring and the relax-
ation of access to financial information).The results produced by a quasi-experimental
design are consistent with (Alm and Beck, 1990) which find in the laboratory experi-
ment that stricter post-amnesty monitoring can generate positive compliance impact.
The limited effect of amnesty could be attributed to the Indonesian size-based
tax administration where tax authority’s resources are prioritized to monitor and
enforce compliance of taxpayers with large tax base and tax payments. Moreover,
individuals taxpayers commonly report smaller tax base and pay smaller taxes relative
to firms. Consequently, little resources could be deployed to strengthen post-amnesty
compliance of smaller-sized individual taxpayers.
From a policy perspective, the results indicate that governments in developing
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countries with limited enforcement capacity can generate short-term revenue from
previously evaded taxes by utilizing tax amnesty program and offering some for-
giveness to tax evaders. In the environment with lack of third-party data and thus
administrative costs to detect non-compliance are high, tax amnesty program can
be a reasonable alternative to collect additional revenue for a revenue-maximizing
government (Langenmayr, 2017).
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Chapter 3
Compliance Effect of Tax Administration Reform on Wealthiest Individu-
als: Evidence from the Indonesian High-Wealth Individuals (HWI) Office
3.1 Introduction
High wealth individuals (HWIs) tax payments are essential to countries’ tax rev-
enue collection (Atkinson et al., 2011). Given their enormous capacity to minimize
taxes through evasion and avoidance (Feldstein, 1995; Scheuer and Slemrod, 2020),
it is reasonable to allocate more resources to ensure their tax compliance. Indeed,
many countries have devoted a special unit (HWI Unit) to scrutinize tax compliance
of wealthy individuals (OECD, 2017) and some countries have reported significant tax
recoveries (Mc Laughlin and Buchanan, 2017). Nevertheless, tax evasion by HWIs
seems to persist as indicated by several major tax evasion and avoidance, such as
offshore-tax-havens scandals (Zucman, 2013, 2014) and migration of the rich (Agrawal
and Foremny, 2019; Kleven et al., 2020).
The persistence of tax evasion and avoidance by wealthy individuals raises ques-
tion regarding the effectiveness of a HWI unit, which is an essential consideration
for governments in deciding an optimal tax policy. For instance, governments may
examine a question of whether they are going to improve tax administration or to
increase tax rates in order to maximize revenue collection from wealthy individu-
als. Basri et al. (2019) find that reforming tax administration is more efficient in
collecting additional revenue than increasing tax rates in the context of corporate
taxation. Nevertheless, few papers have studied the impacts of tax administration
reform in terms of organizational restructuring in the context of individual taxation,
particularly high wealth individuals.
To fill this gap, I use Indonesian administrative data on individual taxpayers and
exploit quasi-experimental variation from the establishment of the Indonesian HWI
office in 2009 to study the impact of tax administration reform on HWIs compliance.
The reform assigned individuals who reside in the Indonesian capital city Jakarta, with
assets of more than 100 billion IDR, and have significant control over corporations.1
The reform increased the intensity in tax administration for HWI in terms of higher
staff to taxpayers ratio, better-skilled staffs, and tailor-made compliance monitoring
approach for HWIs.
This tax administration reform was designed to improve HWIs tax compliance as
well as tax payments. Under an Indonesian ordinary tax office or Small Taxpayers
1Wealth has been commonly used by government as a tax base to increase progressivity of a tax
system. The literature on wealth tax suggests that wealth tax affects wealth accumulation, mobility,
and evasion (Seim, 2017; Jakobsen et al., 2020; Brülhart et al., 2019; Agrawal et al., 2020). (Scheuer
and Slemrod, 2021) provide a nice survey on taxing wealth, discussing the behavioral responses to
a wealth tax as well as optimal wealth tax theory.
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Office (STO), the compliance monitoring activities are prioritized to taxpayers with
high income and tax payments including HWIs. However, HWI’s tax strategy is often
complex and involving some controlled corporations which are not administered by
the office where a HWI is administered, and thus creating hurdles for tax officials to
collect information on controlled corporations from other tax offices, map the HWI
tax strategy and detect tax fraud. The HWI office provides a unique compliance
framework that gathers and analyzes relevant information from various sources as well
as employs well-skilled staffs to accurately evaluate HWIs and controlled corporations
behavior toward tax system and effectively detect non-compliance. The special office
aims to affect the likelihood that income is reported accurately and taxes are paid
accordingly by the HWIs.
In order to empirically examine the extent to which intensification of tax admin-
istration can affect HWI compliance, I compare tax outcomes of wealthy individuals
who are administered by the HWI unit to those of wealthy individuals who would
have been qualified for HWI office (e.g., individuals with assets above the HWI office
assignment threshold of 100 billion IDR and have significant control over corpora-
tions) administered by ordinary tax offices (in Jakarta and other cities) before (2007)
and after (2009-2014) the creation of HWI office. I restrict the sample to include
only top 5 percent of high-income earners because around 80 percent of individu-
als administered by the HWI office are in that category. I separate my study into
three parts. First, I study the compliance impact of the tax administration reform by
comparing reported net income between the control and comparison groups. I find
that the policy reduced income reported by wealthy individuals at the HWI office by
around 44.2 percent over six years compared to their counterparts administered by
STOs in Jakarta. Similarly, I document that the estimated effect is around negative
43.9 percent during the 2009-2014 when the comparison group is HWIs administered
by STOs in other cities. However, the negative effects are slightly smaller by around
4 percentage point when the sample is reduced to top 1 percent of income earners.
This difference are potentially driven by the top marginal tax cut which also occured
in 2009.
Second, I investigate whether the change in top marginal tax rates from 35 percent
to 30 percent for individuals with taxable income above 500 million IDR affects the
estimated effects on the tax administration reform. I decompose the analysis into two
groups. The first group is wealthy individuals with taxable income below 500 mllion
IDR and not affected by the tax cut and the second group is wealthy individuals with
taxable income above 500 million IDR and likely affected by the tax cut. I find that
the estimated effects for the first and second groups are around -19.1 percent and
-21.2 percent when the comparison group is HWIs in Jakarta as well as -22.3 percent
and -13.1 percent when the comparison group is HWIs in other cities. However, the
impacts increase to around negative 40 percent over six years or similar to those of
baseline results when the taxpayers with taxable income of around 4,500 million IDR
higher than the 500-million cut off are pooled with the first group (i.e., taxpayers with
taxable income of up to 500 million IDR). On the other hand, the estimated effects
are around for those with taxable income above 5,000 million IDR are around -19.7
percent when the comparison group is HWIs in Jakarta and around -12.2 percent
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but not statistically significant when the control group is HWIs in other cities. The
results suggest that top marginal tax cut largely affects taxpayers with considerably
high taxable income (i.e., above 5,000 million IDR) and thus errodes the estimated
impact of tax administration reform when the sample is restricted to these particular
taxpayers.
Third, I analyze the revenue implication of the creation of HWI office by com-
paring the income tax liabilities of HWIs administered by the HWI unit to HWIs
administered by STOs for both wealthy individuals affected (e.g., HWIs with taxable
income below 500 million IDR) and not affected (e.g., HWIs with taxable income
above 500 million IDR) by the top marginal tax cut. I find that the administration
reform reduced income taxes paid by wealthy individuals not affected by the tax cut
at the HWI office by around 33.2 percent over six years compared to their counter-
parts administered by STOs in Jakarta. I also document that the estimated effect
is around negative 40.5 percent during the 2009-2014 when the comparison group is
HWIs not affected by the tax cut administered by STOs in other cities. On the other
hand, I find smaller negative effects for those affected by the tax cut of around -21.3
percent and -12 percent when the comparison groups are HWIs in Jakarta and other
cities, respectively. The results indicate that the income tax payment is affected in
the similar way by the reform as the reported net revenue.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. The first contribution is to
a literature studying tax enforcement on high-income earners. Slemrod et al. (2001)
find that high-income earners obtaining an audit threat declare lower reported income
because they consider an audit as a negotiation which does not necessarily results in
the estimation and enforcement of all tax evasion. This paper support this view by
documenting that high-income earners with control over corporations also respond
negatively to the intensification of tax examination.
Secondly, this paper contributes to the literature studying the impact of tax ad-
ministration reform that documents various administrative programs that can effec-
tively improve tax compliance such as wistle-blower system (Naritomi, 2019), elec-
tronic VAT invoices (Fan et al., 2018), pay for perfomance (Khan et al., 2016), and
sized-based tax office (Basri et al., 2019). Specifically, this paper finds that tax admin-
istration reform can also deteriorate tax compliance when it increases the probability
of audit and examination but fails to improve the probability of detection.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on taxation in developing countries
that argue that the lack of capacity to enfoce compliance in developing countries
affect the selection of tax regime (Gordon and Li, 2009; Best et al., 2015; Waseem,
2018). Revenue collection in developing countries are highly dependent on value-
added tax (VAT) and presumptive taxes which are well known with their capacity
to better handle non-compliance. This paper provides evidence on how compliance
in the income tax system is difficult to be enforced and thus potentially prevents
governments from collecting larger revenue from this source.
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3.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I constrast two tax compliance models that yield different pre-
dictions of the effects of the intensification of tax administration on compliance and
earnings. I start with the Allingham and Sadmo’s (1972) standard tax compliance
model. Because of the empirical results cannot be easily rationalized with this model,
I use the extended model discused in Slemrod et al. (2001) that can account for the
empirical findings.
3.2.1 Standard Compliance Model
When the true tax base is not easily observable to the tax authority yet known
to the taxpayer, the latter may be attracted to underreport the tax base. Under the
standard compliance model (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), the underreporting will
be detered by a probability of detection of (p) and a penalty (θ) on unreported tax
base.
Suppose that the true taxable income (y) held fixed and the taxpayer decides to
report taxable income (x) where x < y, and so an amount of evasion is y−x in order
to maximize
EU = (1− p)U(v + t(y − x) + pU(v − θ(y − x) (3.1)
where v represents true after-tax income, y(1 − t), and t denotes the proportional








where yE and yU are income in the examined and unexamined state, respectively.
The model predicts that increases in p will decrease evasion. In other words, when p
equals one, any rational taxpayer will report his or her true income.
3.2.2 Extended Compliance Model
As the paper will show, the empirical findings are not consistent with the predic-
tion of the standard compliance model. Therefore, I consider an alternative model
which extends the standard model and that can rationalize the findings. In the
extended compliance model (Slemrod et al., 2001), the probability of detection is as-
sumed to be an increasing function of the unreported income, and thus the model’s
predictions depend on the relationship between p and evasion. The model further as-
sumes that the expected income upon examination is not a monotonically increasing
function of x but reaches a maximum at some positive level of evasion, where x < y.
However, I replace the term probability of detection (p) in the original model with
probabilty of audit or examination (P ) because in the context of governments with
limited enforcement capacity the former is practically different from the latter. In
other words, 100 percent probability of audit does not necessarily translate into 100
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percent probability of detection because of several conditions, such as lack of third-
party data as well as lack of technological capacity to analyze taxpayers data. Under
100 percent probability of audit, taxpayers may still get less than 100 percent prob-
ability of detection when tax authority does not have all the information regarding
taxpayers unreported income or have all the relevant information but do not have
capacity to analyze it. This condition may occur in a country where banking and
financial information is difficult to obtain or where some of taxpayers have offshore
shell companies in tax havens. In this situation, taxpayer has more information than
tax authority and thus perceive the probability of detection is less than the probability
of audit.
The extended model starts with the optimal solution when the taxpayer is risk
neutral. Yitzhaki (1987) eliminate the corner solution in the standard model’s pre-
diction facing risk-neutral taxpayer by assuming that the probability of audit is an
increasing function of the amount of evasion. Under this assumption, the risk-neutral
taxpayer’s problem is to maximize
E(Y ) = (1− P [x])(v + t(y − x)) + P [x](v − θ(y − x)) (3.3)
where y is the expected income.
If P ′ ≡ ∂p/∂x is zero, then the taxpayers underreport an unlimited amount as
long as it has positive expected utility, i.e. when (1 − P )t − Pθ > 0. However, if
p′ is negative and thus the probability of audit decreases with a decreased evasion,
the first-order condition would be (1 − P )t − pθ = −P ′(θ + t)(y − x). In this case,
the evasion will be constrained by the fact that the increase of P would increases
expected utility.
The extended model further assumes that the expected income upon examination
is not a monotonically increasing function of x but reaches a maximum at some
positive level of evasion, where x < y. In other words, unlike the standard compliance
model, the true tax liability is uncertain and the outcome of an audit depends on the
taxpayer’s initial reported income. Under the second assumption, the risk-neutral
taxpayer’s problem becomes
E(Y ) = (1− P [x])(v + t(y − x)) + P [x](g[x, d]) (3.4)
where g is the expected income upon examination which a function of reported income
x and availability of third-party data d. Thus, the first order-conditon for a maximum
becomes
(1− P )t− Pg′ = −P ′(v + t(y − x)− g). (3.5)
Under the situation where probability of audit is 100 percent, P = 1, and is the
increasing function of evasion P ′ = 0, the optimum of Equation 3.5 is g′ = 0. However
under the situation where probability of audit is less than 100 percent, P < 1, and is







(v + t(y − x)− g), (3.6)
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indicating that in this case the g′ < 0. This result is caused by the facts that the first
and the second terms of the right-hand side are positive and negative, respectively.
Therefore, given the shape of g, the optimal value of x for taxpayer in the second
situation (g′ < 0) is greater than the optimal value of x for taxpayer in the first
situation (g′ = 0). The intuition is that, under a certain examination (e.g. all
HWIs at the HWI office have 100 percent chance of being scrutinized by tax officials
enabled by higher tax official-to-taxpayer ratio, well-skilled officials, and tailor-made
compliance framework), taxpayer does not have to report more income in order to
reduce the probability of detection. Moreover, the extended model illustrates that
g(x) may reach a maximum at x < y. This theoretical predictions suggest that in the
face of a certain examination the optimal strategy might involve some underreporting
of income.
The main implication of the extended model is that the change in evasion upon
the establishment of HWI office does not only represent the change in noncompliance,
as in the standard compliance model, but also involve uncertainty in the outcome
of an examination because of the absent of relevant third-party data and required
technology as well as well-suited compliance framework that can be used to analyze
HWIs complex tax strategies and detect any discrepancies.
Moreover, when probability of audit P is equal to probability of detection p, it
might be irrational for taxpayers to slightly underreport income when he/she face
a certain audit probability. In this case, the probability of detection is not only an
increasing function of the unreported income but also the availability of third-party
data, d. Therefore, the expected income upon examination g is increasingly function
of x and reaches a maximum where x < y if there is lack of available third-party
data. Otherwise, when all information on taxpayer’s income is available to the tax
authority, then g[x, d] is equal to v−θ(y−x). Thus, the uncertainty in audit outcome
would be eliminated because the tax authority also has information that the taxpayer
does have.
3.3 Setting and Data
3.3.1 Income Taxation of Individuals in Indonesia
A modern personal income tax scheme was introduced in 1983 by the Indonesian
government with three marginal income tax rates, e.g., 15 percent for taxable income
of up to 10 million IDR, 25 percent for taxable income from 10 million to 50 million
IDR, and 35 percent for taxable income above 50 million. Prior to the implementation
of HWI unit (2000-2008), the marginal income tax rates were 5 percent for taxable
income of up to 25 million IDR, 10 percent for taxable income from 25 million to 50
million IDR, 15 percent for taxable income from 50 million to 250 million IDR, 25
percent for taxable income from 250 million to 500 million IDR, 35 percent for taxable
income above 500 million IDR. In 2009, the government reduced top marginal tax
rate from 35 percent to 30 percent. This reduction might affect the reported income
of individuals in the sample of this study as they generally have taxable income of
more than 500 million IDR. Previous studies on elasticity of taxable income (Feld-
46
stein, 1995; Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez et al., 2012) suggest that reduction of top
marginal tax rate can minimize evasion and avoidance and thus improve the accuracy
of reported income. Moreover, the studies indicate that the elasticity increases as the
taxable income grows. Thus, this paper expects that the tax cut would positively
affect the reported income.
Wealthy individuals commonly earn a considerable amount of income from capital.
In Indonesia, most of the capital income is subject to final tax regime instead of regular
progressive income tax scheme where the marginal tax rate in the highest bracket is
around 30 percent. For example, dividend payment received by domestic taxpayer
will be taxed at 10 percent, interest from bank deposits will be taxed at 20 percent,
capital gains on share of listed companies are taxed at 0.5 percent and rent income is
taxed at 10 percent. Prior to 2009, dividend received by domestic individual taxpayers
are subject to income tax regime. In 2009, the Indonesian government changed the
provision of taxing dividend from progressive income tax regime to 10 percent final
withholding tax regime.2 This policy reduced reported net income as well as income
taxes paid by wealthy individuals under progressive income tax regime.
Moreover, In 2008, financial crisis emerged in Asian countries because of the US
sub-prime mortgage market collapse. For Indonesia, the effects of financial crisis were
depicted by the exchange rate depreciation of around 30 percent and the stock market
index plummet of around 50 percent in 2008, slowing down economic growth to 5.2
percent (Basri and Siregar, 2009). With sound policy responses, Indonesia managed
to recover from the crisis in 2010 and increase the economic growth to around 6.2
percent (Basri et al., 2013). The crisis may affect Indonesian HWIs in the treated and
comparison groups differently conditional on the level of assets. Thus, in the empirical
analysis I would check the robustness of the estimated impacts by gradually increasing
the assets threshold in the sample as it would potentially exclude HWIs with lesser
share of capital assets as a percentage of total assets and thus less affected by the
crisis as well as the change in dividend tax policy.
3.3.2 Tax Administration Reform in Indonesia
In 2002, the government of Indonesia initiated a tax administration reform to
rebuild its fiscal system after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. The reform consists
of several major initiatives namely organization restructuring, upgrading of employee
compensation scheme, and procurement of modern and integrated IT system.
The organization restructuring transfromed tax offices structure into size-based
tax administration. Several hundreds of Indonesian largest taxpayers which are
mostly corporations would be administered by several Large Taxpayer Office (LTO)
in Jakarta. LTOs are supervised by a Large Taxpayer Regional Office (LTRO). Simi-
larly, several hundreds of large taxpayers in each of Indonesia’s 19 tax regions would be
administered by a Medium Taxpayer Office (MTO).3 The remaining taxpayers would
2Government Regulation number 19 year 2008 concerning Income Tax on Dividend obtained by
Domestic Individual Taxpayers.
3Around 15 Regional Tax Offices have no MTO under their supervision.
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be administered by around 300 Small Taxpayer Office (STO). MTOs and STOs in
each region are administered by a Regional Office (RO).
The organization restructuring was started by the establishment of two LTOs in
2002. The LTO initiative was considered successful by the government and interna-
tional institutions such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank in terms of
corruption eradication in tax offices and provision of excellent tax administration and
services. In 2004-2006, the first wave of MTOs were established in 6 regions. In 2007,
the second wave of MTOs were created in 13 regions and ordinary tax offices in all
regions are transformed into STOs.
The internal structure of tax office was also restructured. Prior to the reform, tax
offices and taxpayer services and compliance activities were structured by tax type,
i.e., corporate income tax, individual income tax, value added tax, and withholding
taxes. Moreover, tax audit was not only conducted by tax offices but also conducted
by separate tax audit offices. The reform integrated all taxpayer services, compliance,
and auditing activities into a single office.
In each tax office, day-to-day compliance monitoring and examination and pro-
vision of services is conducted by around 40 Account Representative (AR) whereas
auditing is performed by around 30 tax auditors. Each AR handles a group of tax-
payers where the number of taxpayers is changing based on the type of offices. In
LTOs and MTOs, each AR and auditor administers around 20 to 30 taxpayers. In
contrary, in STOs, each AR and auditor administers hundreds of taxpayers, in some
cases, thousands of individual taxpayers. However, in each STO, the compliance
monitoring and examination is typically focused on its 100 to 500 largest taxpayers.
The upgraded employee compensation scheme follows the pattern of new orga-
nizational structure. Employees in LTOs recieve slightly higher salary relative to
their counterparts in MTOs and STOs. Likewise, employees in MTOs receive slightly
higher salary relative to their counterparts in STOs. The salary gradation in this
scheme is characterized by the skills and experience required in each type of office.
In other words, more skillful and experienced employee would be recruited by LTOs
or MTOs and thus receive slightly higher compensation.
3.3.3 High-Wealth Individuals Office
In 2009, the government of Indonesia established a High Wealth Individual (HWI)
office in Jakarta to administer individuals who live in Indonesian capital city, Jakarta,
with reported assets of above 100 billion IDR (around 10 million USD in 2009), and
have control over corporations.4 The Indonesian tax authority issued a decision letter
containing a list of qualified wealthy individuals who will be administered by the HWI
tax office. Starting May 2009, around 1,200 wealthy individuals are administered by
the HWI tax office.5
4Appendix Table L.1 shows that the majority of taxpayers (top 5 percent income earners) ad-
ministered by the HWI office have over 40 percent of their total assets in terms of stocks (not held
for sale).
5Director General of Tax Decision number KEP-53/PJ/2009 mandated 1,203 wealthy taxpay-
ers to be administered by the HWI office starting May 1, 2009. On August 1, 2009, around 11
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The objective of the HWI office is to improve wealthy individuals’ tax compliance
and spur tax revenue collection. In general, under an ordinary tax office or Small Tax-
payers Office (STO), the compliance monitoring activities are prioritized to taxpayers
with high income and tax payments including HWIs. However, HWI’s tax strategy is
often complex and involving some controlled corporations which are not administered
by the office where a HWI is administered, and thus creating hurdles for tax officials
to collect information on controlled corporations from other tax offices, map the HWI
tax strategy and detect tax fraud. The HWI office uses a special compliance monitor-
ing approach that does not only involve wealthy individuals but also the corporations
(domestic and foreign) under their control. To check the accuracy of HWIs reporting,
the office also collects third-party data on assets, liabilities, and income from various
sources, e.g., governments institutions, exchange of information (EOI), news media,
internet, and so on. 6. Moreover, the HWI is structured as an LTO and under su-
pervision of the LRTO in Jakarta, and thus has higher official-to-taxpayer ratio and
well-suited officials. Therefore, the key administrative differences between individu-
als handled by HWI office and those handled by STOs is that the former face more
intensive administration than the latter due to higher tax official-to-taxpayer ratio,
more skillful and experienced tax official, and better-tailored compliance strategies.
The special office aims to affect the likelihood that income is reported accurately and
taxes are paid accordingly by the HWIs.
Nevertheless, several challenges were faced by the HWI office during its early
period of operation (DJP, 2010; Widihartanto and Braithwaite, 2016). First, there is
a 6-month delay in transfering taxpayers documents including tax returns, financial
statements, etc. from previous tax offices to the HWI office. During the period of
analysis, the integrity and reliability of the taxpayers database is relatively low due
to poor data entry processes. Thus, tax official frequently used hard-copy files in
the examination in order to avoid inaccurate anlaysis. Second, the EOI provided
limited information about foreign corporate ownerships, particularly in the tax haven
countries. The lack of information on offshore assets create considerable obstacles in
the effort to uncover offshore tax evasion.7 Third, the banking information needed in
tax audit process is often unavailable for tax auditor as the procedure of requesting
bank account information can take up to eight months to complete while the tax
audit must also be finished in eight months.8 These challenges suggest that the
intensification of tax administration in the HWI unit was not accompanied with
sufficient third-party data.
In 2012, the government added around 972 state-owned enterprises into HWI unit’s
wealthy taxpayers were added to the HWI unit by Director General of Tax Decision number KEP-
80/PJ/2009.
6During the period of analysis (2001-2014), policies regarding relaxation of bank secrecy for tax
purpose and automatic exchange of information (AEOI) have not been implemented.
7Alstadsæter et al. (2018) shows that Indonesian wealthy individuals have the highest propensity
to own assets in tax haven countries relative to their counterparts in other countries.
8In 2017, the government rules that the access to banking information for tax audit purpose can
be obtained no longer than 14 days since the request is placed by the tax authority to the Financial
Service Authority (OJK).
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administration and gave the unit a new name, i.e., Large Taxpayers Office Four (LTO
4).9 The government also inreased the number AR to keep the tax official-to-taxpayer
ratio the same. Prior to 2012, the number of AR in HWI unit is around 24 persons
so each AR handles arround 50 taxpayers. Since 2012, the number of AR in LTO 4
increases to around 44 persons so each AR still handles around 50 taxpayers. Thus,
the organizational restructuring may not affect the intensity of tax administration of
wealthy individuals in that special tax office.
During the period of analysis, the tax authority has not amended the decisions
on taxpayers assignment into HWI office and LTO 4. In other words, there has
been few movements of taxpayers from other tax offices to the HWI office or vice
versa. This also implies that taxpayers have no ability to manipulate the treatment
status, for example by reducing their reported assets. Therefore, The creation of HWI
office produces quasi-experimental variation in the intensity of tax administration
conditional on the types of tax offices (HWI office and STOs) and the establishment
date of HWI office (before and after 2009). Using these variations, I compare taxpayer
outcomes, such as net reported income and income taxes, between HWIs administered
by the HWI office and HWIs who were qualified for but not assigned to the HWI
office by the government. The comparisons of means are structured into difference-
in-differences type of analysis.
3.3.4 Data
I use de-identified Indonesian tax administration data from 2007 to 2015 to es-
timate the compliance impacts of the creation of HWI unit. Nevertheless, I only
observe and use taxpayers’ reported asset during the 2014-2015 period to construct
the control group. In the empirical analysis, I concentrate to individuals with assets
above the HWI office assignment threshold (i.e., 100 billion IDR) during 2014-2015
and who are top 5 percent of income earners (during 2007-2015) to match the key
observable characteristics of individuals administered by the HWI office.10 Moreover,
I exclude foreign individuals with the same criteria that are administered by another
special tax office (Foreign Firms and Individuals Tax Office) as they are likely to have
different tax strategy.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of variables used in the study by income income
groups, types of tax office, and cities. As described above, the implementation of HWI
office creates variation in the intensity of tax administration among the wealthiest
and potentially the highest income earners between the HWI office, STOs in Jakarta,
and STOs in other cities. First, the table shows that more than 80 percent of the
individuals administed by the HWI office are top 5 percent of income earners before
and after the reform. Moreover, around 65 percent of the taxpayers at the HWI office
9Director General of Tax Decision number KEP-102/PJ/2012 mandated 972 state-owned cor-
porations to be administered by the HWI office starting April 1, 2012. There has been no document
that explains the rationale of this policy.
10Appendix L describes the distribution of income and assets at the HWI office used in the
construction of the comparison group in this analysis.
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are top 1 percent of income earners before and after the reform.11 Second, the table
shows that the reported net income at the HWI office is stable before and after the
reform. On the other hand, the reported net income of individuals in Jakarta as well
as other Indonesian cities increases during the 2008-2010 period. Third, the table
shows that the income taxes of the top 5 percent and 1 percent income earners at
the HWI office decline over the 2008-2010 period while those of their counterparts
administered by Jakarta’s and other cities’ ordinary tax offices increase during the
same period.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: High-Wealth Individuals
Top 5 Percent (P95.1-100) Top 1 Percent (P99.1-100)
HWI Jakarta Other Cities HWI Jakarta Other Cities
Variables Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
Net income 3.85 3.82 0.63 0.94 0.46 0.79 4.96 5.01 1.45 2.15 1.22 2.78
in billion IDR (8.51) (7.54) (1.15) (3.68) (3.69) (5.61) (9.71) (8.51) (1.66) (6.95) (5.65) (14.69)
Income taxes 1.31 1.09 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.15 1.69 1.44 0.46 0.53 0.35 0.49
in billion IDR (2.98) (2.26) (0.37) (38) (0.75) (0.94) (3.39) (2.55) (0.59) (0.63) (0.51) (1.34)
Number of
observations 804 1,017 40,620 42,363 57,550 61,805 587 743 9,657 11,393 7,455 8,815
Notes: Statistics reported are means with standard deviations in parentheses in the year before
(2008) and after (2010) the establishment of HWI office. All monetary variables are measured in
nominal IDR.
I use several variables to characterize HWIs, such as level of income, level of wealth,
and types of tax office. The level of income is characterized by income percentile which
is contructed using taxpayers’ reported net income. Moreover, I use the HWI office
assignment threshold, i.e. 100 billion IDR, to characterize HWIs and thus those below
the threshold are excluded from the sample. I also use the tax office code to indicate
the intensity of tax administration (e.g., whether the office is an HWI office or an
STO).
The creation of HWI office aims to ensure that high-wealth individuals accurately
report income. Consequently, reported net income is the key variable directly af-
fected by the reform. All individual taxpayers must declare their income on a yearly
basis. This variable is the primary outcome in my empirical analysis on high-wealth
individuals’ compliance.
All individual taxpayers must report their assets and liabilities in the annual tax
return. The assets are reported in their acquisition value instead of market value.
I observe the reported assets in 2014 and 2015 but not in 2009 when they are used
by the government to assign individuals to the HWI office. Therefore, it is possible
that the value of the 2014-2015 reported assets is larger than that of the 2009 due to
selling and purchasing of assets. Panel B of Appendix Figure L.2 shows that around
11Appendix Figure L.1 reports the percentage distribution of reported net income at the HWI
office before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) the reform. The figure suggests that during my data
period the composition of income groups at the HWI unit is relatively stable.
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80 percent of at the HWI office (top 5 percent of income earners) own on average
more than 100 billion IDR of assets during 2014-2015.
HWIs income taxes may not be affected by the reform in the same way as the
reported net income because the variable also depends on marginal tax rates, personal
exemptions, and donation. In 2009, the government reduced the top marginal income
tax rate for taxable income of above 500 million IDR from 35 percent to 30 percent.
Thus, in the empirical analysis, I divide the estimation into two parts, e.g., individuals
with taxable income of below and above 500 million IDR to localize the impact of
the decrease in top marginal tax rate on income tax liabilities.
3.4 The Effect of HWI Office on HWIs Compliance
To study the extent that the intensive tax administration introduced by the es-
tablishment of a special tax unit that administer a group of wealthiest individuals
can enhance compliance, I estimate the effect of the establishment of HWI office on
HWIs’ reported net income using a difference-in-differences research design. This pa-
per concentrate on reported net income as it is the main outcome directly impacted
by the reform. I exploit the variation in treatment from the tax administration re-
form on HWIs by comparing HWIs’ reported income between treated tax office (the
HWI office) and untreated tax offices (STOs) before and after the reform. Moreover,
I decompose the untreated tax offices by region (e.g., Jakarta and other cities) as all
HWIs administered by the HWI office reside in Jakarta.
3.4.1 Descriptive Evidence
Figure 3.1 shows the average log reported net income for wealthiest individuals
(e.g., those with assets above HWI office assignment threshold of around 100 billion
IDR) by types tax office (e.g., HWI and STOs), region (e.g., Jakarta and other cities),
and income level (e.g., top 5 percent and 1 percent income earners) before (2007-
2008) and after (2009-2014) the tax administration reform. Panel A and B show
that reported net income in HWI office and Jakarta STOs evolve uniformly until
the creation of HWI office in 2009. However, the reported net income in HWI office
started to diverge from that of Jakarta STOs in 2009 and 2010. Panel C and D also
show paralel trend in the reported net income between HWI office and STOs in other
cities before the reform. Nevertheless, the reported net income in the HWI office
changes differently from that of STOs in other cities after 2009. The figure suggests
that individuals at the HWI office on average report similar net income in 2009 as in
2008. Individuals at the HWI office on average report larger net income in 2010 but
not as large as that of their counterparts in Jakarta as well as other cities.
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Figure 3.1: The Evolution of Reported Net Income
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of average log reported net income as well as standard
deviation for high-wealth individuals administered by HWI unit (solid-dotted line) and STOs (solid-
triangled line) before (2007-2008) and after (2009-2014) the establishment of HWI unit. The vertical
solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year when the unit was started. Panel A and B show the
comparison between HWI unit and STOs in Jakarta. Panel C and D show the comparison between
HWI unit and STOs in other cities. The results are similar to those of balanced panel presented in
Appendix Figure M.1.
3.4.2 Empirical Analysis
To estimate the effect of the implementation of HWI office across time, I use the
following generalized difference-in-differences framework,
Yit = α + γt + δi +
∑
t=2007




πt ×Di × 1(y = t) + βXit + εit (3.7)
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In this equation, Y is the log tax outcomes such as reported net income and
income taxes for high-wealth individuals i in year t = 2007, ..., 2014, γ is a set of year
fixed effects that represents changes common to all high-wealth individuals, δ is a set
of individual fixed effects that represent time-invariant individual level differences, Di
equals 1 if an individual was administered by the HWI office and 0 if administered
by an STO, and y denotes a one-year window from 2007 to 2014. The year dummy
prior the HWI office operation, 1(t = 2008), is ommited, normalizing the estimates
for θ and π to 0 in 2008. The coefficients π2009 to π2014 capture the impact of the
establishment of HWI unit on income taxes of wealthy individuals.
The effect of the HWI office, averaged across all post-reform periods, can be
estimated using a standard difference-in-differences (DD) specification,
Yit = α + γt + δi + πTreati.Postt + εit (3.8)
where Treat equals 1 if individual was administered by the HWI office and equals
0 if administered by an STO, Post equals 1 if t ≥ 2009 and 0 if t = 2007, and εit is
clustered at the tax office level.
3.4.3 Results
I start the analysis by presenting the coefficients from the standard DD specifi-
cation in Equation (3.8). Table 3.2 shows about 44 percent decrease in the reported
net income for wealthiest individuals who are top 5 percent income earners at the
HWI office relative to their counterparts at the STOs (Jakarta and other cities). The
table also shows that the post-reform increases in reported net income for top 1 per-
cent of income earners at the HWI office are slightly lower, e.g., 40.9 percent and
40.6 percent, compared to their counterparts in Jakarta STOs and other cities STOs,
respectively.12
12Appendix Table M.4 shows that the coefficients from standard DD specification in Equation
(3.8) using taxable income as an outcome are similar to the results from the specification that uses
reported net income as the outcome. The results also robust in both balanced and unbalanced
panels. Appendix Figure M.3 and M.4 show the event study graphs for the specification that uses
taxable income as the outcome.
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Table 3.2: The Effect of HWI Office on Reported Net Income
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.054 0.053 0.007 -0.018
(0.061) (0.035) (0.025) (0.043)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.442∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.041) (0.035) (0.062)
R2 0.852 0.806 0.860 0.807
N Obs. 9,517 6,007 11,009 6,307
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
Figure 3.2 plots the coefficients and the 95 percent confidence intervals estimated
with Equation (3.7). The difference between the treated and control groups is around
zero before the reform. By the time the HWI office is fully operated the difference in
log reported net income between the two groups starts to increase. Panel A and B
demonstrate that the decreases in reported income for top 5 percent and 1 percent
income earners in Jakarta are relatively similar of about 20 percent in 2009. Moreover,
the panels shows that in 2010 the decrease for top 1 percent is slightly larger by almost
8 percentage points. Similarly, Panel C and D show that the reported income at the
HWI office decrease about 20 percent relative to other cities STOs in 2009 for top
5 percent income earners and about 40 percent in 2010. The panels also show that
relative to other cities STOs, the impact on top 1 percent income earners at the HWI
office is moderately larger (Panel D) than that of top 5 percent income earners (Panel
C).
The results are consistent with (Slemrod et al., 2001) which find that increasing
audit probability for high-income earners to 100 percent leads to reductions in tax
liabilities of about 34.8 percent for self-employed and 16.8 percent for wage earners.
They argue that high-income earners are privileged for having dependable tax consul-
tants and thus view that the final outcome of audit can be more manipulated as well
as more contigent on their reported income relative to other individuals. Moreover,
the belief that the audit outcome is manipulable in this paper is likely to be more
stronger because the operation of HWI office during the period of analysis have been
challenged by the lack of relevant third-party data such as banking information and
offshore assets.
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Figure 3.2: The Effect of HWI Office on Reported Net Income by Income Group
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the effect of HWI office on reported net income between 2007 and
2014. Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The results are similar to those
of balanced panel regressions presented in Appendix Figure M.2.
However, the results are likely to be confounded by the change in dividend tax
policy in 2009 and the 2008 Asian financial crisis because individuals admnistered
by the HWI office have larger capital and thus are potentially more responsive to
change in capital tax and economic shocks. Appendix Table L.1 shows that HWIs at
the HWI office have slightly larger share of stock held not for sale as percentage of
total assets and potentially receive more dividend income relative to their counterparts
administered by STOs. Therefore, HWIs at the HWI office potentially also have larger
reduction in reported income due to the change in dividend tax policy which imposes
a lower final tax rate of around 10 percent on dividend and excludes the dividend
income from the reported income taxed at a progressive income tax schedule. In order
to check whether the change in dividend policy confuse the estimation of HWI office
impact, I increase the assest threshold in the sample so that the share of stock not
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held for sale of the control and comparison groups are relatively similar. Appendix
Table M.1, M.2, and M.3 show that the estimates presented in Table 3.2 are similar
when the sample is restricted to those with reported assets above 150 billion IDR,
200 billion, and 500 billion IDR, respectively. The results suggest that dividend tax
policy have affected both control and comparison groups similarly, and thus can be
thought as irrelevant to this study.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity
This subsection studies the heterogeneity of HWI office impact on compliance
by localizing the individuals who are potentially treated by the 2009 top marginal
tax cut. The literature studying the elasticity of taxable income (Feldstein, 1995;
Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez et al., 2012) finds that the individual’s responsiveness to
change in marginal tax rates increases as taxable income goes up. This finding implies
that the Indonesian top marginal tax cut would be responded differently by affected
taxpayers. For instance, taxpayers just above the top tax bracket cut off would
respond mildly while taxpayers further above the cut off would respond intensively
to the tax cut. Therefore, I expect that the variation in the responsiveness to tax cut
produces heterogeneity in the estimated compliance impact of HWI office. In other
words, the results presented in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 may be affected by the tax
cut because many HWIs in the sample have taxable income over 500 million IDR.
In order to study the heterogenous impact of HWI office, I decompose the sample
into two parts, e.g., HWIs with taxable income of up to 500 million IDR and not
affected by the tax cut as well as HWIs with taxable income above 500 million IDR
and affected by the tax cut. Figure 3.3 shows that the estimated effects of HWI
office are slighlty lower than the previous results. Appendix Table M.5 shows that
the DD coefficients for Panel A and B of Figure 3.3 are around -19.1 percent and
-21.2 percent when the comparison group is HWIs in Jakarta as well as -22.3 percent
and -13.1 percent when the comparison group is HWIs in other cities. Moreover, the
reduction of the estimated impacts is also observed when the comparison group is
HWIs in other cities as shown in Panel C and D.
The depletion of the estimated impacts demonstrated in Figure 3.3 which occurs
when the sample is decomposed into affected and unaffected groups by the cut off of
top tax bracket (i.e., 500 million IDR) may be driven by the variation in the intensity
of responses to tax cut, e.g. , taxpayers just above the cut off are not much affected
by the cut relative to those with taxable income significantly further above the tax
cut. In other words, the latter are potentially greatly treated by the tax cut and
reported larger net income relative to the former.
In addition, Table 3.1 suggests that individuals at the HWI office have higher
average reported net income and thus higher average taxable income relative to other
individuals in the sample. This income gap indicates that few individuals with the
highest taxable income are administered by the HWI unit. These individuals poten-
tially receive larger positive treatment from the tax cut and increase their reported
income by higher percentage than other individuals which eventually reduces the
estimated impacts for the affected sample presented in Panel B and D of Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: The Impact of HWI Office on Reported Net Income by Tax Bracket
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7) in
Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on reported income between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table M.5. The graphical evidence
comparing the evolution of log average reported net income between the groups is presented in
Appendix Figure M.5.
Figure 3.4 depicts that the magnitude of the estimated impacts approaches the
baseline results presented in Figure 3.2 when the taxpayers with taxable income of
around 500 million IDR above the cut off are combined with those with taxable
income below the cut off. The estimated impacts from the standard DD specification
for Panel A and B of Figure 3.4 are -30.2 percent and -21.3 percent (see Appendix
Table M.6). The estimated impacts are similar to the baseline estimates when the
taxpayers with taxable income of around 1,500 million and 4,500 million IDR from
the cut off are pooled with those below the cut off (see Appendix Figures M.6 and
M.7) The DD coefficients when the samples are taxpayers with taxable income below
2,000 million and 5,000 million are around -0.331 and -0.395 when the comparison
group is HWIs in Jakarta as well as about -0.363 and -0.415 when the control group
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is HWIs in other cities. On the other hand, the DD coefficients for the samples
which include HWIs with taxable income above 2000 million and 5000 million IDR
are around -0.176 and -0.197 when the comparison group is HWIs in Jakarta as well
as around -0.116 and -0.122 but not statistically significant when the control group
is HWIs in other cities (see Appendix Tables M.7 and M.8). The results suggest that
top marginal tax cut largely affects taxpayers with considerably high taxable income
and thus errodes the estimated impact of tax administration reform for this group.
Figure 3.4: The Impact of HWI Office on Reported Net Income by Tax Bracket
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7) in
Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on reported income between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table M.6.
Moreover, the results show that wealthy individuals respond differently to the in-
tensification of tax administration conditional on their reported income. Specifically,
wealthy individuals with higher reported income at the HWI office demonstrate larger
reduction in reported income relative to their counterparts at the HWI office. This
heterogeneity indicates that the belief in manipulable examination outcome among
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HWIs that face a certain probability of examination strengthen as the reported in-
come grows. It is reasonable that the HWIs with larger reported income to have that
belief because they are more likely to have more complex tax strategies which make
the effort to detect non-compliance harder, particularly when the relevant third-party
data was not available.
3.4.5 Tax Revenue Implication
The impact of HWI office operation on the income taxes may not be in the same
manner as on the reported income because the former is also affected by personal
exemption, marginal tax rates, as well as donation. Nevertheless, the size of per-
sonal exemptions as well as donation for HWIs are considerably small relative to
their reported income and so potentially would not facilitate behavioral responses to
the implementation of HWI office. Moreover, the revenue impact could be smaller
particularly to individuals with taxable income of more than 500 million IDR as the
government cut the top marginal tax rate by 5 percentage points. The revenue im-
pact could also be similar to the compliance impact particularly when HWIs with
significantly large taxable income (e.g., above 5,000 million IDR) are excluded from
the estimation. To investigate the impact of the policy on tax revenue, I study the
policy effects on income taxes for individuals with taxable income below and above
the top tax bracket cut off, i.e., 500 million IDR. I also gradually increase the cut off
to find possible heterogenity in the revenue impact. Likewise, I use Equation (3.7)
with log of income taxes as an outcome.
Figure 3.5 shows the revenue effect of the operation of HWI office. Panel A and C
show that the revenue impacts for HWIs with taxable income below 500 million IDR
(not affected by the tax cut) are similar to the previous net income effects of around
-20 percent in 2009 and -40 percent since 2010. The DD coefficients are about -33.2
percent for Panel A and -40.5 percent for Panel C over six years (see Appendix Table
N.1). Moreover, Panel B shows a smaller positive revenue change relative to HWIs
affected by the tax cut in Jakarta with the average effects of around - 21.3 percent.
Panel D also shows a smaller revenue effects compared to HWIs affected by the tax
cut in other cities with average treatment effect of about -12 percent over six years.
The revenue effects are increasingly larger when the cut off is increased to 1 billion,
2 billion, and 5 billion IDR as presented in Appendix N. For instance, the average
treatment effect increases from -45.8 percent to -53.8 percent as the cut off expanded
from 1 billion to 5 billion IDR for the specification that uses HWIs administered
by STOs in Jakarta as a comparison group. With similar expansion, the average
treatment effect increases from -49.6 percent to -58.2 percent when the comparison
group is HWIs in other cities. On the other hand, the average impacts for taxpayers
above the cut offs are similar to the baseline result for affected sample (HWIs with
taxable income over 500 billion IDR) of around -20 percent and -12 percent when
the comparison groups are HWIs administered by STOs in Jakarta and other cities,
respectively. The results suggest that the effects of HWI office on the income taxes are
slightly larger than on the reported income, except for taxpayers with considerably
large taxable income, e.g., above 5 billion IDR.
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Figure 3.5: The Impact of HWI Office on Income Taxes
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on income taxes between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table N.1. The graphical evidence
comparing the evolution of log average income taxes between the groups is presented in Appendix
Figure N.1.
3.5 Conclusion
Given the enormous capability of high-wealth individuals to evade taxes, collect-
ing tax revenue from and maintaining compliance of those individuals are difficult
tasks for some countries. Hence, a special unit to administer HWIs tax matters
is considered reasonable by tax authorities. However, the trend of HWIs’ evasion
seems to persist, raising a question whether the implementation of HWI unit is effec-
tive or not. This paper studies the compliance effects of tax administration reform
on wealthiest individuals by utilizing the creation of Indonesian HWI unit in 2009
and Indonesian tax administration data. I use difference-in-differences estimator to
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estimate the parameter of interest, exploiting quasi-experimental variation in the in-
tensity of tax administration created by the policy conditional on the timing of policy
implementation and types of tax office.
I find that the policy reduced income reported by wealthy individuals at the HWI
office by around 40 percent over six years compared to their counterparts administered
by STOs in Jakarta. I also find that the estimated effects are similar when the
comparison group is HWIs administered by STOs in other cities. Moreover, the
impacts on income tax liabilities are slightly larger than the reported income, except
for the sample that includes HWIs with significantly large taxable income. The results
indicate that the creation of HWI unit have negative effects on the reported net
income as well as income taxes of wealthiest individuals during the period of analysis
(2009-2014). The findings are consistent with the argument that under a certain
examination the optimal strategy for a taxpayer should involve some underreporting
of income because the outcome of an examination is uncertain or manipulable Slemrod
et al. (2001).
Furthermore, the negative effects are increasingly larger as the reported income
expands. The finding suggests that the belief that final outcome of tax examination
can be more manipulable and more contigent on reported income when HWIs are
imposed with a 100 percent chance of examination become stronger as their level
of reported income increases. There is a possibility that HWIs with greater income
could afford better tax consultants and get more sophisticated tax strategies which
effectively conceal greater tax evasion, particularly when the relevant third-party data
is hardly available.
From a policy perspective, this study sheds light on how intensification of tax
administration may not work with the absent of relevant third-party data that can
be used to verify the accuracy of reported income, assets, and liabilities. In the context
of HWIs which are widely known to have complex tax strategies including offshore
tax planning, the results indicate that lack of third-party data, particularly on assets
(domestic and foreign) can potentially hamper the enforcement of HWIs compliance.
This policy implication is compatible with the literature on tax compliance that argues
that external factors (e.g., probability of detection, tax rates, and level of income)
are the main drivers of taxpayer compliance (Slemrod, 2019).




This dissertation studies three major tax policies in Indonesia (e.g., tax simpli-
fication, tax amnesty, and establishment of a special tax unit) designed to improve
compliance and increase revenue collection. These policies also represent typical tax
policy adopted by governments, particularly in the developing countries where en-
forcement capacity is often hampered by informality, large share of small businesses,
and lack of third-party data. The first chapter studies the firms’ behavioral responses
to tax simplification in Indonesia by exploiting the implementation of turnover tax in
2013 and the expansion of value added tax (VAT) registration threshold in 2014 as
well as the fact that both turnover tax eligibility and VAT registration thresholds are
at the same value. I find that firms intentionally bunch just above the threshold in
order to avoid turnover tax regime. I also document that some firms started to bunch
just below the threshold in order to avoid VAT registration when the VAT threshold
expanded in 2014. The results indicate that firms can face different types of notch
at the same threshold and thus respond differently conditional on tax incentives (e.g.
tax rates) and non-tax incentives (e.g., compliance costs and benefits). From a policy
perspective, the study suggests that government should consider not only tax but
also non-tax incentives in formulating tax simplification.
The second chapter examines the determinants of tax evasion and the compliance
impacts of forgiving tax evaders using the 2016 Indonesian tax amnesty program
where the government offers a set of discounted tax rates and penalties exemption
on declaration of unreported net assets as an equivalent of unreported income. I
document that the intensity in withholding tax, tax rates, level of income, as well
as types of employment influence the decision to evade taxes. The results are con-
sistent with the argument that externals factors motivate tax compliance. I further
compare reported income between wage earners and self-employed individuals in each
income percentile before and after the amnesty and find that the program provides
no meaningful compliance effect except limitedly for those in the very top of income
distribution, e.g., around 6.1 percent increase in reported net income. The limited
amnesty impact is potentially driven by the Indonesian size-based tax administration,
which prioritized its resources to monitor compliance of taxpayers with high tax base
and payments.The results implies that tax amnesty can facilitate compliance when
post-amnesty compliance is increased.
The third chapter investigates the effect of intensification of tax administration on
HWIs compliance using the establishment of an HWI office in 2009 which administer
individuals with gross assets of more than 100 billion IDR (around 10 million USD
in 2009) and who reside in Indonesian capital city Jakarta. The policy creates quasi-
experimental variation in the intensity of tax administration depending on the date
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of HWI office implementation (before and after the policy) and the types of tax office
(HWI office and ordinary tax offices). I document that the HWIs reported income
and income taxes at the HWI office decreased by about 40 percent over six years
relative to those of HWIs administered by ordinary tax offices. The results support
the literature that predicts that in the face of a certain examination the optimal
strategy for high-income earners might involve some underreporting of income. From
a policy perspective, this study sheds light on how tax administration reform may
not work with the absent of relevant third-party data that can be used to check the




Firms Financial Ratio and Tax Regime Decomposition
Table A.1: Tax Payments Ratio
2.8-4.8 Billion IDR 4.8-6.8 Billion IDR
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Income tax ratio
Income tax 0.00874 0.00860 0.00676 0.00649 0.00668 0.00919 0.00899 0.00835 0.00806 0.00827
regime (0.01254) (0.01513) (0.01274) (0.01862) (0.01480) (0.01396) (0.01571) (0.01726) (0.01425) (0.01551)
Turnover tax - 0.00527 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 - 0.00524 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
regime - (0.00836) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) - (0.00864) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Withholding tax ratio
Income tax 0.00429 0.00524 0.00443 0.00396 0.00394 0.00413 0.00426 0.00423 0.00401 0.00394
regime (0.00847) (0.01172) (0.01511) (0.01315) (0.01133) (0.00874) (0.00997) (0.01599) (0.01349) (0.01264)
Turnover tax - 0.00227 0.00028 0.00024 0.00019 - 0.00251 0.00035 0.00022 0.00025
regime - (0.00688) (0.00567) (0.00234) (0.00178) - (0.00738) (0.00395) (0.00169) (0.00297)
Final tax ratio
Income tax 0.00341 0.00842 0.00942 0.00914 0.00912 0.00359 0.00498 0.00474 0.00536 0.00567
regime (0.02253) (0.03558) (0.02817) (0.02833) (0.02606) (0.04075) (0.07242) (0.04751) (0.06889) (0.05223)
Turnover tax - 0.00688 0.01031 0.01041 0.01030 - 0.00501 0.01029 0.01043 0.01027
regime - (0.03623) (0.01632) (0.01785) (0.00965) - (0.01581) (0.01039) (0.01632) (0.02196)
Turnover tax ratio
Income tax 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
regime (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Turnover tax - 0.00441 0.00898 0.00908 0.00917 - 0.00405 0.00848 0.00829 0.00829
regime - (0.00248) (0.00272) (0.00281) (0.00314) - (0.00264) (0.00318) (0.00349) (0.00329)
Number of observation
Income tax 15,923 7,752 7,434 9,527 10,595 8,742 8,386 8,625 10,400 10,543
regime
Turnover tax - 7,230 10,261 13,157 16,333 - 2,208 2,436 2,929 3,449
regime
Notes: Statistics reported are means with standard deviations in parentheses. All financal ratio are
calculated with respect to turnover.
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Table A.2: Financial Ratio
2.8-4.8 Billion IDR 4.8-6.8 Billion IDR
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Direct input ratio
Income tax 0.662 0.642 0.652 0.664 0.643 0.684 0.676 0.678 0.681 0.661
regime (0.339) (0.397) (0.411) (0.400) (0.365) (0.317) (0.379) (0.400) (0.379) (0.373)
Turnover tax - 0.638 0.619 0.606 0.592 - 0.708 0.689 0.663 0.666
regime - (0.357) (0.361) (0.352) (0.338) - (0.300) (0.308) (0.347) (0.302)
Operating expenses ratio
Income tax 0.273 0.281 0.283 0.316 0.322 0.249 0.275 0.281 0.298 0.311
regime (0.345) (0.429) (0.447) (0.519) (0.472) (0.311) (0.389) (0.392) (0.435) (0.401)
Turnover tax - 0.291 0.302 0.319 0.327 - 0.225 0.249 0.291 0.281
regime - (0.329) (0.320) (0.338) (0.342) - (0.278) (0.291) (0.407) (0.337)
Non-operating income ratio
Income tax 0.018 0.027 0.031 0.023 0.032 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.022 0.027
regime (0.218) (0.255) (0.322) (0.247) (0.309) (0.192) (0.181) (0.153) (0.256) (0.255)
Turnover tax - 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.013 - 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.009
regime - (0.118) (0.158) (0.092) (0.143) - (0.158) (0.052) (0.076) (0.068)
Non-operating expenses ratio
Income tax 0.011 0.023 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.023 0.023
regime (0.123) (0.264) (0.215) (0.255) (0.217) (0.123) (0.177) (0.134) (0.209) (0.208)
Turnover tax - 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 - 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012
regime - (0.140) (0.090) (0.109) (0.083) - (0.099) (0.092) (0.098) (0.096)
Foreign net income ratio
Income tax 0.00008 0.00014 0.00016 0.00008 0.00011 0.00015 0.00008 0.00006 0.00011 0.00002
regime (0.00575) (0.00919) (0.00567) (0.00658) (0.01028) (0.01041) (0.00353) (0.00278) (0.00837) (0.00153)
Turnover tax - 0.00004 0.00025 0.00003 0.00002 - 0.00000 0.00015 0.00000 0.00000
regime - (0.00337) (0.01172) (0.00157) (0.00193) - (0.00000) (0.00454) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Non-taxable income ratio
Income tax 0.048 0.154 0.197 0.178 0.184 0.051 0.071 0.076 0.085 0.091
regime (0.217) (0.377) (0.451) (0.404) (0.428) (0.204) (0.293) (0.274) (0.319) (0.311)
Turnover tax - 0.265 0.517 0.521 0.534 - 0.239 0.497 0.496 0.481
regime - (0.338) (0.535) (0.502) (0.511) - (0.349) (0.481) (0.536) (0.487)
Net fiscal adjustments ratio
Income tax 0.033 0.108 0.118 0.143 0.136 0.031 0.055 0.053 0.072 0.067
regime (0.219) (0.430) (0.387) (0.466) (0.439) (0.225) (0.315) (0.279) (0.345) (0.324)
Turnover tax - 0.212 0.388 0.409 0.421 - 0.195 0.406 0.418 0.403
regime - (0.523) (0.497) (0.517) (0.511) - (0.335) (0.537) (0.504) (0.523)
Loss carry forward ratio
Income tax 0.00175 0.00111 0.00068 0.00078 0.00066 0.00163 0.00142 0.00091 0.00135 0.00116
regime (0.02909) (0.03155) (0.02558) (0.01718) (0.02379) (0.02721) (0.01860) (0.02555) (0.02494) (0.02233)
Turnover tax - 0.00104 0.00048 0.00017 0.00018 - 0.00144 0.00059 0.00033 0.00019
regime - (0.02160) (0.01482) (0.00659) (0.00904) - (0.01746) (0.01013) (0.00747) (0.00632)
Taxable income ratio
Income tax 0.068 0.065 0.053 0.047 0.049 0.063 0.061 0.056 0.054 0.054
regime (0.085) (0.099) (0.096) (0.087) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.087) (0.848)
Turnover tax - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
regime - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of observation
Income tax 15,923 7,752 7,434 9,527 10,595 8,742 8,386 8,625 10,400 10,543
regime
Turnover tax - 7,230 10,261 13,157 16,333 - 2,208 2,436 2,929 3,449
regime
Notes: Statistics reported are means with standard deviations in parentheses. All financal ratio are
calculated with respect to turnover.
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Notes: The figure shows the share of firms by tax regime around the threshold. The light blue areas
represent firms in the income tax regime, the blue areas represent firms in the turnover tax regime,
and the dark blue areas represent firms in the mixed regime in the current year. Firms below the
threshold would adopt turnover tax regime and those above the threshold would adopt income tax
regime in the next year.
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Appendix B
Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity on Bunching Reponses




A. Single threshold (2013) 1.370 1.173 1.163
(0.354) (0.359) (0.356)
B. Multiple thresholds (2014-2017)
B.1 Income tax regime
2014 1.434 1.092 1.081
(0.491) (0.227) (0.224)
2015 1.198 1.201 1.167
(0.405) (0.174) (0.169)
2016 1.213 0.781 0.751
(0.377) (0.283) (0.277)
2017 0.736 0.608 0.577
(0.422) (0.405) (0.396)
B.2 Turnover tax regime
2014 1.011 0.635 0.573
(0.406) (0.199) (0.197)
2015 1.049 0.82 0.846
(0.414) (0.374) (0.318)
2016 1.519 1.238 1.272
(0.585) (0.594) (0.470)
2017 1.626 1.707 1.405
(0.626) (0.616) (0.583)
Notes: The table displays the average excess mass b(y∗) as well as standard errors estimated in
Equation (1.18) by counterfactual’s degree of polynomial in each fiscal year after the reforms. In
general, the estimates shrink as the degree of polynomials go up, yet converge at the 7th degree
polynomial.
68
Figure B.1: Summary of Excess Bunching
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Notes: The figure displays the yearly excess bunching with 95 percent confidence intervals from 2013
to 2017. Panel A shows that the excess bunching in the upward notch due to turnover tax threshold
was stable from 2013 to 2015 but has been trending down afterward. Panel B shows that the excess
bunching in the upward notch due to VAT threshold has been increasing since 2014.
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Excess bunching (b) = 0.608 (0.405)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform (2013-2017) in bins of
100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is rep-
resented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a fifth-order polynomial estimated as in
Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the upper part of the excluded region. Ex-
cess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near the threshold relative to the average
counterfactual count in this region.
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Excess bunching (b) = 1.707 (0.616)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counterfac-
tual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the VAT registration threshold expansion (2014-
2017) in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR. The
threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a fifth-order polynomial esti-
mated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the upper part of the excluded
region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near the threshold relative to
the average counterfactual count in this region.
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Figure B.4: Bunching in the Income Tax Regime by Industry
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Excess bunching (b) = 2.042 (0.426)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration
threshold expansion (2014-2017) in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR
and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a
fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the
upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near
the threshold relative to the average counterfactual count in this region.
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Figure B.5: Bunching in the Turnover Tax Regime by Industry
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Excess bunching (b) = 1.177 (0.287)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration
threshold expansion (2014-2017) in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR
and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a
fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the
upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near
the threshold relative to the average counterfactual count in this region.
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Excess bunching (b) = 1.421 (0.504)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration
threshold expansion (2014-2017) in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR
and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a
fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the
upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near
the threshold relative to the average counterfactual count in this region.
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Excess bunching (b) = 1.245 (0.494)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration
threshold expansion (2014-2017) in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR
and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a
fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the
upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near
the threshold relative to the average counterfactual count in this region.
74
Appendix C
Misreporting of Income Subject to Final Tax
This appendix discusses the possible misreporting of income subject to final tax
by a group of firms in the turnover tax regime. This misreporting is possibly due to
a different interpretation of income in line 4 on the attachment I of the Indonesian
corporate tax return (form 1771-I) as well as its consequences to the bunching analysis.
I find that around 50 percent of firms in the turnover tax regime report gross income
or turnover as income subject to final tax while the rest of firms reports commercial
net income as income subject to final tax. As a consequence, the former reports
massive positive fiscal adjustments in order to obtain zero fiscal net income whereas
the latter has no change in fiscal adjustments.
The Indonesian income tax law mandates firms to calculate and report taxable
income regardless whether they are in the income tax or the turnover tax regimes.
In order to get an estimate of taxable income, the Indonesian corporate income tax
return suggests that firms have to adopt the following formulas1
CNI = TO −DI −OE +NOI −NOE + FCNI (C.1)
FNI = CNI − IFT +NFA (C.2)
TI = FNI − LCF (C.3)
where CNI, FNI, TI, TO, DI, OE, NOI, NOE, FCNI, IFT , NFA, and LCF
represent commercial net income, fiscal net income, taxable income, turnover (gross
income), direct inputs (cost of good sold), operating expenses, non-operating income,
non-operating expenses, foreign commercial income, income subject to final tax and
non-taxable income, net fiscal adjustments, and loss carry forward. The net fiscal
adjustment equals positive fiscal adjustments minus negative fiscal adjustments. The
commercial income reflects firms’ profit (loss) reported in the financial statements to
their stakeholders. The fiscal net income reflects firms’ net of book-tax-adjustments
income used in the calculation of income tax liability if no loss carry forward is
claimed.
Theoretically, firms in the turnover tax regime have no fiscal net income as well
as taxable income because they are taxed at a final rate of 1 percent on gross income
instead of a flat income tax rate of 25 percent on profit (net income). Given the
reporting regulation, these firms have to both report and then cancel commercial net
income to eventually get zero fiscal net income and taxable income. Equation (C.1)
1Figure C.1 and C.2 depict the main page of the Indonesian corporate income tax return used
to calculate taxable income and income tax liabilities in English and Bahasa Indonesia respectively.
Figure C.3 and C.4 depict the attachement I of the return used to calculate fiscal net income. The
item that is frequently misreported by half of the firms is red circled in these figures.
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indicates that firms in the turnover tax regime may simply report commercial net
income as income subject to final tax and no net fiscal adjustments to get fiscal net
income equals zero.2
Figure C.5 shows relatively identical shapes of distribution of commercial net in-
come between firms in the income tax regime and those in the turnover tax regime
over 2013-2017 period. The resemblance implies that the distribution of income sub-
ject to final tax would have similar to the distribution of commercial net income if
all firms impute commercial net income as income subject to final tax in line 4 of the
attachment I.
However, Figure C.6 depicts that around 50 percent firms report gross income
as income subject to final tax after the implementation of turnover tax in 2013.
This behavior was observed for both corporation and partnership and thus was not
correlated with firms’ administrative structure. Consequently, these firms have to
cancel out the error by reporting large fiscal adjustments as demonstrated in Figure
C.8 to obtain zero fiscal net income shown in Figure C.9. On the contrary, firms that
correctly report income subject to final tax would have zero fiscal net income and
report around zero fiscal adjustments.
The behavior produces an uncommonly large discontinuity in fiscal adjustment
ratio at the threshold after the turnover tax was implementation in 2013 and thus
provide misleading evidence on the mechanism behind the bunching responses. Figure
C.11 shows that the discontinuities in net fiscal adjustments ratio (panel E) corre-
spond to the discontinuity in income subject to final tax ratio (panel D) when the
sample includes firms with incorrect misreporting. However, Figure C.12 shows that
the discontinuities in net fiscal adjustments ratio disappear and the discontinuities
in income subject to final tax ratio diminish. Therefore, I exclude the misreporting
behavior in the discussion of mechanism of bunching responses by dropping firms that
misreport income subject to final tax from the sample.
The exclusion may not affect the credibility of analysis because the remaining
sample can produce similar bunching responses at the threshold. Figure C.13 shows
that excess masses just below the threshold still emerge in the corrected sample though
with relatively smaller magnitude relative to those of the incorrect sample depicted
in figure C.14. The weaker bunching responses suggests that the corrected sample
provides lower bound estimate of discontinuity at the threshold which relates to the
type of mechanims (e.g., real economic or behavioral responses).
2The Indonesian tax authority on April 16, 2020 uploaded a tutorial video on filling cor-
porate tax return that suggests an imputation of commercial net income as income sub-
ject to final tax for firms in the income tax regime. The video can be accessed on
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwBRBhjyURs.
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Figure C.1: Main Page of the Indonesian Corporate Income Tax Return (English)
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Figure C.2: Main Page of the Indonesian Corporate Income Tax Return (Bahasa
Indonesia)
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Figure C.3: Attachment I of the Indonesian Corporate Income Tax Return (English)
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Figure C.4: Attachment I of the Indonesian Corporate Income Tax Return (Bahasa
Indonesia)
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Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of commercial net income to turnover ratio for firms with
annual turnover within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR from the threshold. The
gray bars represent the percentage of firms in the income tax regime. The hollow bars represent the
percentage of firms in the turnover tax regime. The sum of gray bars is 100. The sum of hollow
bars is also 100.
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Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of income subject to final tax to turnover ratio for firms
with annual turnover within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR from the threshold.
The gray bars represent the percentage of firms in the income tax regime. The hollow bars represent
the percentage of firms in the turnover tax regime. The sum of gray bars is 100. The sum of hollow
bars is also 100.
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Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of income subject to final tax to turnover ratio for firms
with annual turnover within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR from the threshold.
The gray bars represent the percentage of firms in the income tax regime. The hollow bars represent
the percentage of firms in the turnover tax regime. The sum of gray bars is 100. The sum of hollow
bars is also 100.
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Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of net fiscal adjustments to turnover ratio for firms with
annual turnover within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR from the threshold. The
gray bars represent the percentage of firms in the income tax regime. The hollow bars represent the
percentage of firms in the turnover tax regime. The sum of gray bars is 100. The sum of hollow
bars is also 100.
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Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of fiscal net income to turnover ratio for firms with annual
turnover within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR from the threshold. The gray
bars represent the percentage of firms in the income tax regime. The hollow bars represent the
percentage of firms in the turnover tax regime. The sum of gray bars is 100. The sum of hollow
bars is also 100.
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Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of direct inputs (cost of good sold) to turnover ratio for
firms with annual turnover within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR from the
threshold. The gray bars represent the percentage of firms in the income tax regime. The hollow
bars represent the percentage of firms in the turnover tax regime. The sum of gray bars is 100. The
sum of hollow bars is also 100.
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Figure C.11: Summary of Discontinuities at the Threshold with Incorrect Reporting
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Notes: The figure plots the estimated size of discontinuity in the financial ratio with 95 percent
confidence interval at the threshold over 2012-2017 period for the original dataset that contains
incorrect reporting. The estimates are graphically presented in Figure C.15, C.17, C.19, C.21, C.23,
and C.25. The left solid vertical line denotes the year of the implementation of turnover tax regime.
The right solid vertical line denotes the year of the expansion of VAT registration threshold.
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Figure C.12: Summary of Discontinuities at the Threshold without Incorrect Report-
ing
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Notes: The figure plots the estimated size of discontinuity in the financial ratio with 95 percent
confidence interval at the threshold over 2012-2017 period for the corrected dataset that contains no
incorrect reporting. The estimates are graphically presented in Figure C.16, C.18, C.20, C.22, C.24,
and C.26. The left solid vertical line denotes the year of the implementation of turnover tax regime.
The right solid vertical line denotes the year of the expansion of VAT registration threshold.
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Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration
threshold expansion (2014-2017) in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR
and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a
fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the
upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near
the threshold relative to the average counterfactual count in this region.
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Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration
threshold expansion (2014-2017) in bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR
and 2000 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a
fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the
upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near
the threshold relative to the average counterfactual count in this region.
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Difference at the threshold d = 0.081 (0.012)
Notes: The figure plots the average direct input to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT threshold.
The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the
threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of
the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.
Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized
threshold.
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Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,315 / right = 12,439
Difference at the threshold d = 0.03928 (0.01463)
Notes: The figure plots the average direct input to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT threshold.
The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the
threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of
the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.
Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized
threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,893 / right = 9,207






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,932 / right = 11,136






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,288 / right = 12,479






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 23,637 / right = 14,376






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 27,924 / right = 14,973






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 30,607 / right = 15,107
Difference at the threshold d = −0.037 (0.012)
Notes: The figure plots the average operating expense to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT
threshold. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left
of the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the
threshold. Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the
normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,893 / right = 9,207






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 10,987 / right = 9,560






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 12,443 / right = 10,582






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,211 / right = 12,072






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 17,493 / right = 12,382






















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,308 / right = 12,437
Difference at the threshold d = −0.01264 (0.01349)
Notes: The figure plots the average operating expense to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT
threshold. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left
of the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the
threshold. Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the
normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,883 / right = 9,203




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,913 / right = 11,122




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,277 / right = 12,469




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 23,619 / right = 14,360




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 27,910 / right = 14,966




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 30,593 / right = 15,096
Difference at the threshold d = −0.043 (0.012)
Notes: The figure plots the average commercial net income to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT
threshold. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left
of the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the
threshold. Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the
normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,883 / right = 9,203




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 10,961 / right = 9,546




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 12,437 / right = 10,578




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,198 / right = 12,064




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 17,486 / right = 12,377




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,303 / right = 12,434
Difference at the threshold d = −0.0309 (0.01214)
Notes: The figure plots the average commercial net income to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT
threshold. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left
of the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the
threshold. Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the
normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,891 / right = 9,207









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,934 / right = 11,132









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,277 / right = 12,475









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 23,637 / right = 14,373









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 27,924 / right = 14,975









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 30,609 / right = 15,103
Difference at the threshold d = −0.174 (0.016)
Notes: The figure plots the average non-taxable net income to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT
threshold. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left
of the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the
threshold. Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the
normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,891 / right = 9,207









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 10,992 / right = 9,560









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 12,446 / right = 10,585









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,213 / right = 12,074









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 17,497 / right = 12,384









































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,315 / right = 12,439
Difference at the threshold d = −0.03207 (0.00323)
Notes: The figure plots the average non-taxable net income to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT
threshold. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left
of the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the
threshold. Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the
normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,890 / right = 9,209





















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,931 / right = 11,133




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 18,566 / right = 12,283




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 22,609 / right = 14,115




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 26,464 / right = 14,688




















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 29,150 / right = 14,799
Difference at the threshold d = −0.104 (0.012)
Notes: The figure shows the plot of average fiscal adjustment to turnover ratio near the threshold
after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration threshold expansion (2014-2017). The vertical
solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold is 50
and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the threshold
represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold. Difference
at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,890 / right = 9,209












































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 10,989 / right = 9,558












































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 12,445 / right = 10,584












































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,207 / right = 12,069












































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 17,493 / right = 12,382












































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,309 / right = 12,435
Difference at the threshold d = −0.00037 (0.00721)
Notes: The figure shows the plot of average fiscal adjustment to turnover ratio near the threshold
after the turnover tax reform and VAT registration threshold expansion (2014-2017). The vertical
solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold is 50
and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the threshold
represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold. Difference
at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,888 / right = 9,205

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,923 / right = 11,126

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,284 / right = 12,475

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 23,622 / right = 14,369

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 27,914 / right = 14,966

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 30,596 / right = 15,098
Difference at the threshold d = 0.006 (0.006)
Notes: The figure plots the average fiscal net income to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT thresh-
old. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of
the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the
threshold. Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the
normalized threshold.
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−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 16,888 / right = 9,205

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 10,979 / right = 9,553

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 12,439 / right = 10,579

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 15,201 / right = 12,066

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 17,484 / right = 12,375

















































−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 19,301 / right = 12,433
Difference at the threshold d = −0.000037 (0.00777)
Notes: The figure plots the average fiscal net income to turnover ratio around the 2014 VAT thresh-
old. The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of
the threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the
right of the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the




Bunching at the 2003 VAT Registration Threshold
In this appendix, I further study the impacts of VAT registration threshold by
comparing the behavioral responses at the old (2003) and the new (2014) thresholds.
The threshold is increased fourfold from 600 million to 4.8 billion IDR. Thus, firms
around the old threshold have smaller size than the those around the new threshold
and might respond the discontinuity differently. Similar to the new threshold, income
tax notch occurs at the old threshold where firms with turnover of up to 600 billion
IDR can select between presumptive tax (deemed-profit-tax) and income tax. The
difference is that the turnover tax offers significantly smaller average tax rate relative
to deemed-profit tax scheme.
Figure D.1 displays bunching responses at the old and the new thresholds. The
excees bunching at the new VAT notch is similar that of the new threshold. Moreover,
Figure D.2 and D.3 show that the excess bunching the old VAT threshold is relatively
stable over the 2007-2013 period and disappears after the expansion of VAT threshold
in 2014. The results suggest that larger firms are not more responsive to the VAT
notch than small firms.
Unlike the new VAT threshold, the previous threshold creates no discontinuity in
direct input to turnover ratio as demonstrated in Figure D.4 and D.5. Furthermore,
Figure D.6 and D.7 show that there no discontinuity in tax liabilities during 2007-
2013 near the old VAT threshold. Finally, Figure D.8 and D.9 show that firms around
the old VAT threshold do not manipulate fiscal adjustment to counterbalance the
misreporting inputs. The results suggest that the old VAT threshold persuades real
responses rather than evasion responses (misreporting inputs) as in the new VAT
notch. The differences in the size of annual turnover between firms around the old
and those near the new threshold might explain this variation.
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Figure D.1: Bunching at the VAT Registration Thresholds







































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual
Excess bunching (b) = 0.937 (0.375)





























−2000 −1000 0 1000 2000
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual
Excess bunching (b) = 1.072 (0.494)
Notes: The figure displays the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover. Panel A shows the turnover distribution at the 2003
VAT registration threshold in bins of 10 million IDR within a range of -400 million IDR and 400
million IDR. Panel B shows the turnover distribution at the 2014 VAT registration threshold in
bins of 100 million IDR within a range of -2000 million IDR and 2000 million IDR. The threshold
is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a fifth-order polynomial estimated as
in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the upper part of the excluded region.
Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near the threshold relative to the average
counterfactual count in this region.
104





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual
Excess bunching (b) = 0.744 (0.264)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counterfac-
tual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover before the VAT reform (2007-2012) in bins of 10 million
IDR within a range of -400 million IDR and 400 million IDR. The threshold is represented by a
vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a fifth-order polynomial estimated as in Equation (1.16).
The shaded area is the excess mass in the upper part of the excluded region. Excess bunching b
is excess bunching in the omitted region near the threshold relative to the average counterfactual
count in this region.
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−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual





































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold in million IDR
Observed Counterfactual
Excess bunching (b) = 0.093 (0.016)
Notes: The figure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated counter-
factual (solid-dashed line) of annual turnover before (2013) and after (2014-2017) the VAT reform
in bins of 10 million IDR within a range of -400 million IDR and 400 million IDR. The threshold
is represented by a vertical solid line. The counterfactual is a fifth-order polynomial estimated as
in Equation (1.16). The shaded area is the excess mass in the upper part of the excluded region.
Excess bunching b is excess bunching in the omitted region near the threshold relative to the average
counterfactual count in this region.
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−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 44,341 / right = 19,084






































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 48,886 / right = 20,682






































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 50,275 / right = 21,515






































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 53,912 / right = 23,820












































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 53,593 / right = 24,127












































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 59,065 / right = 27,835
Difference at the threshold d = 0.021 (0.011)
Notes: The figure plots the average direct input to turnover ratio near the 2003 VAT threshold. The
vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold
is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the
threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.
Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized
threshold.
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−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 56,194 / right = 28,188






































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 57,682 / right = 31,064






































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 65,505 / right = 35,559






































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 67,391 / right = 37,288






































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 65,808 / right = 36,905
Difference at the threshold d = −0.027 (0.015)
Notes: The figure plots the average direct input to turnover ratio near the 2003 VAT threshold. The
vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold
is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the
threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.
Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized
threshold.
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−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 44,332 / right = 19,082














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 48,878 / right = 20,679














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 50,272 / right = 21,514














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 53,903 / right = 23,818














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 53,584 / right = 24,127














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 59,057 / right = 27,832
Difference at the threshold d = −0.0004 (0.00042)
Notes: The figure plots the average tax liability to turnover ratio near the 2003 VAT threshold. The
vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold
is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the
threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.
Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized
threshold.
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−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 56,179 / right = 28,114














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 57,675 / right = 31,062














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 65,495 / right = 35,554














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 67,383 / right = 37,288














































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 65,802 / right = 36,901
Difference at the threshold d = 0.00027 (0.00031)
Notes: The figure plots the average tax liability to turnover ratio near the 2003 VAT threshold. The
vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the threshold
is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of the
threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.
Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized
threshold.
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−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 44,206 / right = 19,026











































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 48,698 / right = 20,599











































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 50,045 / right = 21,415











































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 53,663 / right = 23,705











































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 53,312 / right = 24,011











































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 58,699 / right = 27,658
Difference at the threshold d = 0.003 (0.004)
Notes: The figure plots the average fiscal adjustment to turnover ratio near the 2003 VAT threshold.
The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the
threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of
the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.
Difference at the threshold d is the size of discontinuity in the dependent variable at the normalized
threshold.
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−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 55,332 / right = 27,764











































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 55,310 / right = 29,922











































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 62,479 / right = 34,102









































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 64,025 / right = 35,556









































−400 −200 0 200 400
Distance to the threshold (Million IDR)
Number of observations: left = 62,507 / right = 35,290
Difference at the threshold d = 0.000 (0.009)
Notes: The figure plots the average fiscal adjustment to turnover ratio near the 2003 VAT threshold.
The vertical solid line is the normalized threshold. The number of bins used to the left of the
threshold is 50 and to the right of the threshold is also 50. The solid lines in the left and the right of
the threshold represent the conditional expectation function for firms below and above the threshold.




Utility and Profit Maximization Frameworks in Bunching Analysis
This appendix discusses the similarity between of the utility maximization and
profit maximization frameworks used in the bunching analysis, specifically around a
tax notch. Following Liu and Lockwood (2016), the relationship between bunching
responses and other parameters such as input cost ratio and share of B2C sales derived
















1− λ(1− (1 + t)
−e)







where λ is a measure of household final demand for heterogenous goods produced
by small firms relative to the demand for homogenous goods produced by large firms
(1 − λ), ω denotes intermediate good, and t represents VAT rate. Equation (E.2)
implies that the sales responses ∆y∗ increases as the share of B2C sales λ increases
and as the share of input to total cost ω decreases. Furthermore, the sales responses
∆y∗ increases as elasticity of output supply e increases if T is decreasing in e.
Liu and Lockwood (2016) argue that bunching equation derived from profit max-
imization is similar to that of utility maximization framework when all sales are
B2C, firms are price takers, and the production function is fixed-coefficients. They
further argue that Equation (E.2) can be converted into the equation prescribing re-
lationship between tax elasticity, bunching responses, and tax notch in Kleven and
Waseem (2013) or Equation (1.14) in this paper by assuming that elasticity of tax



























































Solutions and Rearrangements in the Bunching Theoretical Framework
This appendix describes the solutions to maximization problems and rearrange-
ments of equations involved in the bunching theoretical framework. I show the steps
to solve and rewritten equations common to the bunching analysis as they rarely
presented in the literature.
F.1 Single threshold
The first problem to be solved is the utility maximization for the firm just below



















(1− T )e = y
a
(F.3)
y = a(1− T )e (F.4)
Moreover, using the first order condition y∗ = (a∗ −∆a∗)(1− T )e, the utility for
the lowest-productivity firm (type L) as the marginal buncher at the best interior
point y∗ −∆y∗ can be rearranged as

























(a∗ −∆a∗)(1− T )e+1 (F.7)






From the condition uL = uH and using the relationship (y∗−∆y∗) = (a∗−∆a∗)(1−

































− (1− t)y∗ = 0 (F.10)
Moreover, the previous equation can be rewritten by multiplying all of the terms
with (e+1)
(1−T )y∗ as follows (
y∗ −∆y∗



























































F.2.1 Downward tax notch
Using the first-order condition y∗(1−α) = (a∗−∆a∗)(1− γB)e, the utility for the
lowest-productivity firm (type L) as the marginal buncher at the best interior point




































From the condition uLD = u
H
D and using the relationship (y
∗ − ∆y∗)(1 − α) =
(a∗ − ∆a∗)(1 − γB)e, the rearrangement of terms in Equation (1.9) to get Equation













































− (1− γA − θ)(1− α)y∗ = 0
To simplify the previous equation, all of the terms will be multiplied by (e+1)
y∗(1−α)(1−γB) .

































































For the third term, the rearrangement is the following










F.2.2 Upward tax notch
Using the first order condition y∗ = (a∗ + ∆a∗)(1 − γA − θ)e, the utility for the
highest-productivity firm (type H) as the marginal buncher at the best interior point




























(a∗ −∆a∗)(1− γA − θ)e+1 (F.32)
uHU = (a






From the condition uLD = u
H
D and using the relationship (y
∗ + ∆y∗)(1 − α) =
(a∗ + ∆a∗)(1− γB)e, the rearrangement of terms in Equation (1.13) to get Equation
(1.14) is the following






















(a∗ + ∆a∗)(1− γA − θ)e+1 = 0 (F.35)
y∗(1− α)(1− γB)− e
e+ 1
(









(y∗ + ∆y∗)(1− α)
(1− γB)e
)
(1− γA − θ)e+1 = 0 (F.36)
To simplify the previous equation, all of the terms will be divided by (y∗+∆y∗)(1−
α)(1− γB). For the first term, the rearrangement is the following
y∗(1− α)(1− γB)



















(y∗ + ∆y∗)(1− α)
(y∗ + ∆y∗)(1− α)(1− γB)(1− γB)e
)(
y∗(1− α)(1− γB)e
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(y∗ + ∆y∗)(1− α)(1− γB)(1− γB)e
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Probability of Participating in Tax Amnesty Using Linear and Ordered
Logit Specifications
This appendix describes the probability of participation by income decile for the
linear as well as ordered logit specifications. Figure G.1 shows that the slopes of the
probability distribution produced from linear regresssion are similar for both wage
earners and self-employed individuals. On the other hand, Figure G.2 demonstrates
the ordered logit regression creates variation in slopes conditional on income decile and
types of employment. The results suggest that the ordered logit specification provides
better estimates on the probability of participation as a proxy for past probability of
conducting evasion.
Moreover, Figure G.2 demonstrates that the ordered logit specification is suitable
to exploit variation in the size of tax amnesty rates as well as timing of the net assets
declaration. The figure shows that the probability of participation in the first period
of tax amnesty which offers the lowest tax rates is significantly higher than in other
periods in almost all income deciles. The finding suggests that lower tax rates induced
taxpayers to accurately report their taxable base.
However, Figure G.2 depicts that the probability of participation in the second
period is relatively similar to that in the second period, in spite of the former’s lower
tax rates. The result suggest the tax rate differential does not matter in the two-last
period of amnesty, implying that the probability of participation in the first period
is not only affected by tax rates but also the preference in timing of declaration. In
other words, all else equal, taxpayers prefers to declare unreported net-assets in the
first period relative to other periods.
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Figure G.1: The Probability of Participation by Decile (Linear Regression)





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed
Predictive Margins of ky with 95% CIs





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed





































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Withholding tax to tax liability ratio
Wage earner Self−employed
Notes: The figure shows the probability of participating in each period of the amnesty program
conditional on withholding tax ratio and income decile.
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Figure G.2: The Probability of Participation by Decile (Ordered Logit)
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Notes: The figure shows the probability of participating in each period of the amnesty program
conditional on withholding tax ratio, income decile, and types of employment.
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Appendix H
Despriptive Evidence on Amnesty Impacts
This appendix provides the descriptive evidence for the impact of tax amnesty
program on the reported net income by income percentile. The quantile estimation
strategy allows better comparison of control and treatment group relative to the mean
estimation framework by acknowledging the left-skewness of probability distribution
of tax evasion.
Figure H.1 shows that similar pre-trends are observed in most of the percentiles in
the Decile 10. Likewise, the figure shows that the post-trends are also similar except
in percentile 100 (Panel A). Furthermore, Figure H.2 to H.9 show that parellel pre-
and post-trends are observed in all percetiles. The results suggest that tax amnesty
affects compliance limiltedly of those in the percentile 100.
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Figure H.1: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 10: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 91 through 100. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.2: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 9: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 81 through 90. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.3: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 8: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 71 through 80. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.4: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 7: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 61 through 70. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.5: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 6: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 51 through 60. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.6: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 5: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 41 through 50. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
128
Figure H.7: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 4: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 31 through 40. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.8: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 3: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 21 through 30. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.9: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 2: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 11 through 20. The
vertical solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year of tax return (2015) when the amnesty program
was implemented.
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Figure H.10: Reported Income by Percentile in Decile 1: Self-Employed vs Wage
Earners
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of mean log real net income for self-employed (solid-diamond
line) and wage earners (solid-dotted line) before (2010-2015) and after (2016-2017) the amnesty
program. Panel A through I show the evolution of income taxes for Percentile 1 through 10. The




Robustness Checks on the Amnesty Impacts
Table I.1: Tax Amnesty Impacts on Reported Net Income (Unbalanced Panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
P-20 P-30 P-40 P-50 P-60 P-70 P-80 P-90 P-100
Before Amnesty
(2010 to 2014) x -0.000 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.018
Self-employed (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.019)
After Amnesty
(2016 to 2017) x 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053∗∗∗
Self-employed (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
R2 0.998 0.999 0.996 0.995 0.996 0.994 0.989 0.953 0.080
N Obs. 266809 267210 266587 266446 266526 266483 266670 266448 266444
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment, industry classification, and regional tax office fixed effects.
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Appendix J
Amnesty Impacts by Income Decile
Table J.1: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-91 P-92 P-93 P-94 p-95 P-96 P-97 P-98 P-99 P-100
Before -0.001 0.002 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.000 -0.004∗ 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.019
(2010-14) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.020)
After -0.000 -0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.064∗∗
(2016-17) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.020)
Constant 19.041∗∗∗19.119∗∗∗19.207∗∗∗19.308∗∗∗19.422∗∗∗19.553∗∗∗19.726∗∗∗19.949∗∗∗20.296∗∗∗21.125∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
R2 0.947 0.937 0.919 0.897 0.866 0.825 0.730 0.561 0.304 0.019
N Obs. 70352 71811 73519 77934 81044 83641 86191 89285 93915 84450
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
Table J.2: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-81 P-82 P-83 P-84 p-85 P-86 P-87 P-88 P-89 P-90
Before 0.001 0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(2010-14) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
After 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(2016-17) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 18.486∗∗∗18.529∗∗∗18.576∗∗∗18.623∗∗∗18.672∗∗∗18.724∗∗∗18.780∗∗∗18.839∗∗∗18.903∗∗∗18.969∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.989 0.987 0.985 0.983 0.981 0.977 0.973 0.967 0.963 0.955
N Obs. 48739 51069 53168 55454 57692 59751 61129 62969 64506 67268
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
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Table J.3: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-71 P-72 P-73 P-74 p-75 P-76 P-77 P-78 P-79 P-80
Before -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.000
(2010-14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
After 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ -0.000
(2016-17) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 18.162∗∗∗18.188∗∗∗18.214∗∗∗18.242∗∗∗18.272∗∗∗18.302∗∗∗18.335∗∗∗18.371∗∗∗18.406∗∗∗18.445∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.994 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.992 0.991 0.990
N Obs. 30411 31455 33093 34595 36592 38451 40357 43174 44939 46666
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
Table J.4: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-61 P-62 P-63 P-64 p-65 P-66 P-67 P-68 P-69 P-70
Before -0.001 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 0.001∗
(2010-14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
After 0.000 -0.001∗ 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 0.001∗∗
(2016-17) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 17.957∗∗∗17.974∗∗∗17.992∗∗∗18.011∗∗∗18.029∗∗∗18.050∗∗∗18.071∗∗∗18.092∗∗∗18.114∗∗∗18.138∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
N Obs. 20809 21450 22883 23531 24229 25034 26001 27097 27623 28837
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
Table J.5: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-51 P-52 P-53 P-54 p-55 P-56 P-57 P-58 P-59 P-60
Before 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗
(2010-14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
After -0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗
(2016-17) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 17.826∗∗∗17.836∗∗∗17.847∗∗∗17.860∗∗∗17.872∗∗∗17.884∗∗∗17.897∗∗∗17.911∗∗∗17.926∗∗∗17.942∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.993 0.992 0.992 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
N Obs. 13057 13326 14101 14858 16605 16354 17156 18270 18919 20402
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
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Table J.6: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-41 P-42 P-43 P-44 p-45 P-46 P-47 P-48 P-49 P-50
Before -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(2010-14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
After -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(2016-17) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 17.746∗∗∗17.754∗∗∗17.759∗∗∗17.766∗∗∗17.775∗∗∗17.783∗∗∗17.790∗∗∗17.798∗∗∗17.807∗∗∗17.817∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.990 0.979 0.960 0.943 0.909 0.920 0.972 0.983 0.989 0.990
N Obs. 10729 10681 10647 10359 10505 11113 10813 11513 11523 11699
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
Table J.7: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-31 P-32 P-33 P-34 p-35 P-36 P-37 P-38 P-39 P-40
Before 0.000 -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000
(2010-14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
After 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗ 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000 -0.001∗∗
(2016-17) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 17.681∗∗∗17.688∗∗∗17.694∗∗∗17.700∗∗∗17.706∗∗∗17.712∗∗∗17.720∗∗∗17.727∗∗∗17.732∗∗∗17.738∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.995 0.993
N Obs. 8270 8663 8808 9537 9174 9480 10258 9429 9526 10201
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
Table J.8: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-21 P-22 P-23 P-24 p-25 P-26 P-27 P-28 P-29 P-30
Before 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗ 0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(2010-14) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
After -0.001∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(2016-17) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 17.617∗∗∗17.624∗∗∗17.629∗∗∗17.636∗∗∗17.643∗∗∗17.650∗∗∗17.656∗∗∗17.662∗∗∗17.669∗∗∗17.675∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.998
N Obs. 8557 9029 8478 8129 8206 7100 7356 7861 7342 7780
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
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Table J.9: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P-11 P-12 P-13 P-14 p-15 P-16 P-17 P-18 P-19 P-20
Before 0.002 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.000
(2010-14) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
After 0.375∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.005 0.005∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(2016-17) (0.091) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 17.370∗∗∗17.429∗∗∗17.481∗∗∗17.527∗∗∗17.560∗∗∗17.576∗∗∗17.586∗∗∗17.596∗∗∗17.603∗∗∗17.610∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.779 0.953 0.985 0.994 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
N Obs. 12238 13942 13079 11762 11146 10516 10582 10034 9337 9394
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
Table J.10: Compliance Impact of Amnesty in Decile 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
P-6 P-7 P-8 P-9 P-10
Before (2010-2014) -0.601 0.237∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.025∗
(0.769) (0.075) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
After (2016-2017) 0.310∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.012)
Constant 11.931∗∗∗ 16.293∗∗∗ 16.949∗∗∗ 17.187∗∗∗ 17.298∗∗∗
(0.491) (0.016) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.197 0.514 0.894 0.744 0.906
N Obs. 722 7119 9137 10743 12215
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the regional tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of
employment and regional tax office fixed effects.
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Appendix K
Amnesty Impacts by Income Percentile
This appendix provides the event study graphs that plots the coefficients from
the estimating Equation (2.2), representing the impact of tax amnesty program on
the reported net income by income percentile. The quantile generalized difference-in-
differences framework requires the estimating equation to be applied independently
to each percentile to reflect the shape of probability distribution of tax evasion.
Figure K.1 shows that coefficients θ2010 to θ2014 are around zero in most of the
percentiles in the Decile 10. Similarly, the figure shows that coefficients π2016 and
π2017 are indifference from zero in most of the percentiles in the Decile 10 except in
percentile 100. Moreover, Figures K.2 to K.9 show that coefficients θ and π are neither
statistically nor economically significance in the rest of income percentiles, suggesting
that the amnesty program provides no compliance effect except to taxpayers in the
top 1 percent of income earners.
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Figure K.1: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 91-100
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.2: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 81-90
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.3: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 71-80
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.4: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 61-70
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.5: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 51-60
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.6: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 41-50
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.7: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 31-40
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.8: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 21-30



























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year



























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year
































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year
































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year






























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year






























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year




























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year
Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.9: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 11-20






























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year



































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year



























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year



























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year





























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year































2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year




























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year




























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year






















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year
Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
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Figure K.10: The Impact of Amnesty on Reported Income in Percentile 1-10
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Notes: The figure displays the coefficients θ and π from Equation (2.2) that represent the differ-
ences in reported net income between self-employed and and wage earners (the solid-dotted line).
The x -axis represents the fiscal years that correspond to annual period of taxpayers’ bookkeping
and financial statements. The vertical solid-dashed line indicates one fiscal year before (2015) the
amnesty implementation where the coefficient is normalized to zero. The solid-dashed lines plot the
95 percent condifence interval.
148
Appendix L
HWIs Income and Assets
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Notes: Panel A and B show the percentage distribution of reported net income of wealthy individuals
administered by the HWI office before (2007-2008) as well as after (2009-2015) the operation of the
unit, respectively.
Figure L.2: Average Reported Asset
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Notes: Panel A and B show the average reported asset by reported net income percentile during the
2014-2015 period for all ordinary tax offices as well as the HWI office, respectively.
149
Table L.1: Share of HWIs Assets (Percent)
Top 5 Percent (P95.1-100) Top 1 Percent (P99.1-100)
Types of Asset HWI Jakarta Other Cities HWI Jakarta Other Cities
Stock 41.67 27.01 19.81 41.59 30.79 25.48
Deposit 10.44 9.49 9.46 10.63 12.71 13.02
Land and/or building for shelter 9.84 20.82 29.02 10.22 19.03 24.25
Stock held for sale 4.54 2.76 2.18 4.48 2.66 2.62
Notes: The table shows the average share of major assets owned by HWIs as a percentage of total
assets over the 2014-2015 period.
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Appendix M
Further Evidence on The Compliance Impacts of HWI Office
M.1 Robustness Checks
Table M.1: HWI Office Impacts on Reported Net Income (Assets > 150 billion IDR)
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.029 0.014 0.024 0.032
(0.045) (0.053) (0.039) (0.075)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.452∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.072) (0.044) (0.093)
R2 0.859 0.811 0.870 0.810
N Obs. 4,743 3,027 5,724 3,459
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
Table M.2: HWI Office Impacts on Reported Net Income (Assets > 200 billion IDR)
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.031 0.040 0.042 0.046
(0.051) (0.071) (0.047) (0.078)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.485∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.088) (0.044) (0.078)
R2 0.860 0.815 0.870 0.819
N Obs. 3,705 2,390 4,613 2,923
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
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Table M.3: HWI Office Impacts on Reported Net Income (Assets > 500 billion IDR)
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit -0.002 0.055 -0.019 -0.097
(0.096) (0.132) (0.059) (0.080)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.583∗∗∗ -0.566∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.088) (0.044) (0.071)
R2 0.853 0.793 0.862 0.802
N Obs. 1,728 1,192 2,176 1,555
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
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Figure M.1: The Evolution of Reported Net Income (Balanced Panel)
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of average log reported net income as well as standard
deviation for high-wealth individuals administered by HWI unit (solid-dotted line) and STOs (solid-
triangled line) before (2007-2008) and after (2009-2014) the establishment of HWI unit. The vertical
solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year when the unit was started. Panel A and B show the
comparison between HWI unit and STOs in Jakarta. Panel C and D show the comparison between
HWI unit and STOs in other cities.
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Figure M.2: The Impact of HWI Unit on Reported Net Income (Balanced Panel)
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on reported net income between 2007 and
2014. Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level.
154
Table M.4: HWI Office Impacts on Taxable Income
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent Top 5 Percent Top 1 Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.071 0.063 0.024 -0.016
(0.063) (0.036) (0.032) (0.053)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.459∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.034) (0.056)
R2 0.847 0.801 0.859 0.804
N Obs. 9,513 6,075 11,007 6,307
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
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Figure M.3: The Impact of HWI Unit on Taxable Income (Unbalanced Panel)
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on taxable income between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level.
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Figure M.4: The Impact of HWI Unit on Taxable Income (Balanced Panel)
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on taxable income between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level.
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M.2 Heterogeneity of the Compliance Impact of the HWI office
Figure M.5: The Evolution of Reported Net Income by Tax Bracket
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of average log reported net income as well as standard
deviation for high-wealth individuals administered by HWI unit (solid-dotted line) and STOs (solid-
triangled line) before (2007-2008) and after (2009-2014) the establishment of HWI unit. The vertical
solid-dashed lines represent the fiscal year when the unit was started. Panel A and B show the
comparison between wealthies individuals with taxable income below 500 million IDR at HWI unit
and STOs. Panel C and D show the comparison between wealthies individuals with taxable income
above 500 million IDR HWI unit and STOs in other cities.
158
Table M.5: HWI Office Impacts on Reported Net Income by Tax Bracket
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤500M TI>500M TI≤500M TI>500M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.059 0.031 0.055 -0.048
(0.030) (0.035) (0.061) (0.059)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.191∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.046) (0.044)
R2 0.759 0.833 0.792 0.846
N Obs. 1,753 7,525 2,492 8,168
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
Table M.6: HWI Office Impacts on Reported Net Income by Taxable Income Group
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤1000M TI>1000M TI≤1000M TI>1000M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.050 0.051 0.019 -0.023
(0.028) (0.050) (0.020) (0.101)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.302∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.092
(0.034) (0.043) (0.023) (0.057)
R2 0.694 0.794 0.744 0.805
N Obs. 3,851 5,428 5,175 5,550
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
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Table M.7: HWI Office Impacts on Reported Net Income by Taxable Income Group
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤2000M TI>2000M TI≤2000M TI>2000M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.031 0.060 0.010 -0.052
(0.025) (0.057) (0.021) (0.118)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.331∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.116
(0.031) (0.046) (0.027) (0.066)
R2 0.741 0.744 0.766 0.757
N Obs. 5,755 3,538 7,349 3,420
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
Table M.8: HWI Office Impacts on Reported Net Income by Taxable Income Group
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤5000M TI>5000M TI≤5000M TI>5000M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.061 -0.024 0.033 -0.034
(0.055) (0.085) (0.023) (0.213)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.395∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.122
(0.036) (0.057) (0.029) (0.092)
R2 0.797 0.695 0.807 0.717
N Obs. 7,708 1,648 9,200 1,651
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
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Figure M.6: The Impact of HWI Office on Reported Net Income by Taxable Income
Group
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7) in
Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on reported income between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table M.7.
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Figure M.7: The Impact of HWI Office on Reported Net Income by Taxable Income
Group
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7) in
Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on reported income between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table M.8.
162
Appendix N
Additional Results on the Revenue Impact of HWI office
N.1 Descriptive Evidence on the Revenue Impact
Figure N.1: The Evolution of Income Taxes
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of average log income taxes as well as standard deviation
for high-wealth individuals administered by HWI unit (solid-dotted line) and STOs (solid-triangled
line) before (2007-2008) and after (2009-2014) the establishment of HWI unit. The vertical solid-
dashed lines represent the fiscal year when the unit was started. Panel A and B show the comparison
between wealthies individuals with taxable income below 500 million IDR at HWI unit and STOs.
Panel C and D show the comparison between wealthies individuals with taxable income above 500
million IDR HWI unit and STOs in other cities.
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N.2 DD Estimates for the Revenue Impact
Table N.1: HWI Office Impacts on Income Taxes by Tax Bracket
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤500M TI>500M TI≤500M TI>500M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.099 0.034 0.106 -0.049
(0.052) (0.037) (0.110) (0.062)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.332∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.120∗
(0.052) (0.034) (0.078) (0.048)
R2 0.683 0.833 0.724 0.846
N Obs. 1,752 7,517 2,502 8,163
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
Table N.2: HWI Office Impacts on Income Taxes by Taxable Income Group
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤1000M TI>1000M TI≤1000M TI>1000M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.119 0.047 0.067 -0.023
(0.091) (0.053) (0.084) (0.103)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.458∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗ -0.496∗∗∗ -0.080
(0.062) (0.048) (0.056) (0.060)
R2 0.628 0.794 0.679 0.803
N Obs. 3,847 5,422 5,185 5,545
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
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Table N.3: HWI Office Impacts on Income Taxes by Taxable Income Group
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤2000M TI>2000M TI≤2000M TI>2000M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.102 0.043 0.069 -0.055
(0.079) (0.063) (0.074) (0.117)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.477∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ -0.112
(0.052) (0.055) (0.048) (0.069)
R2 0.692 0.742 0.721 0.758
N Obs. 5,750 3,534 7,357 3,417
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
Table N.4: HWI Office Impacts on Income Taxes by Taxable Income Group
HWI vs STOs in Jakarta HWI vs STOs in Other Cities
TI≤5000M TI>5000M TI≤5000M TI>5000M
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before Reform
(2007) x HWI Unit 0.143 -0.032 0.105 -0.025
(0.075) (0.085) (0.071) (0.212)
After Reform
(2009 to 2014) x HWI Unit -0.534∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗ -0.115
(0.048) (0.057) (0.045) (0.092)
R2 0.763 0.694 0.772 0.719
N Obs. 7,699 1,646 9,205 1,651
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications are controlling for fiscal year, types of tax office, and
individual fixed effects.
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N.3 Event Study on the Revenue Impact
Figure N.2: The Impact of HWI Office on Income Taxes by Taxable Income Group
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on income taxes between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table N.2.
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Figure N.3: The Impact of HWI Office on Income Taxes by Taxable Income Group
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on income taxes between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table N.3.
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Figure N.4: The Impact of HWI Office on Income Taxes by Taxable Income Group
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Notes: The figure plots the regression coefficients (θ and π) from the estimating specification (3.7)
in Subsection 3.4.2, representing the impact of HWI unit on income taxes between 2007 and 2014.
Standard errors are clustered clustered at the tax office level. The coefficients from the standard
DD specification in Equation (3.8) are presented in Appendix Table N.4.
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